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Since the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, many Koreans
migrated to Japan seeking a livelihood. The majority of these
emigrants were in the lowest economic status of Japanese society.
After World War II, of the 2.5 million Koreans in Japan, the
majority were repatriated to their homeland, leaving approximately
600,000 Korean residents.
Koreans in Japan are divided factionally, each group separate-
ly favoring either South or North Korea. This, in turn, creates
political differences and animosities.
The South Korea-Japan Treaty of 196 5 granted permanent resi-
dent status to Korean residents. However, the inconsistencies
in the Japanese government's treatment of Korean residents causes
Koreans many disadvantages. Despite the phenomenal growth in the
Japanese economy, the economic situation of Korean residents in
Japan has not improved much since the South Korea-Japan Treaty
of 1965.
From the sociological aspect, a degree of assimilation has
taken place among Korean youths but it remains to be seen whether
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INTRODUCTION
The population of Korean residents in Japan was very small
for several years after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.
It included many students who were receptive to the liberal
ideas of the Western world being especially inclined to study
the philosop y and industrial techniques of Western civilization,
Korea did not have enough colleges and high schools and many
young Koreans who could afford it traveled to Japan to continue
their education, since Tokyo was looked upon as the intellectual
center of East Asia. These students later became the leaders of
the Korean Independence Movement in Japan.
In the latter part of World War I, and during the 1920 's,
the first group of Korean laborers went to Japan. Japanese
purchases of Korean farmland had driven Korean farmers to near-
starvation. Indeed, harsh economic conditions had forced many
Koreans to emigrate to Japan during this period. Another group
of laborers was drafted during World War II to fill Japan's
acute labor shortages; most laborers worked in the coal mines
and lived under miserable conditions. Nearly 30 percent of the
coal miners in Japan were Koreans.
When Japan surrendered after World War II there were about
2.5 million Koreans in Japan, and half of them (with their
families) had been forcibly drafted as laborers. By 1948,
with the cooperation of the Japanese government, the Occupation
authorities repatriated over one million Koreans.
8

Since Korean-Japanese feelings had been hostile even before
World War II, after the war Korean residents found themselves
in the role of scapegoats for the dissatisfactions expressed
by the Japanese population. Because of the hostility between
the two groups during the war, Koreans in Japan found themselves
discriminated against socially and occupationally with few
exceptions.
The Korean groups in Japan are divided factionally, each
favoring either North Korea or South Korea. The Koreans in
Japan, however, staunchly maintain their national identity,
keeping themselves socially apart, speaking Korean, forming
their organizations and sending their children to Korean schools
They remain demonstrably unassimilated, cohesive, and loyal to
the idea of a unified homeland.
After fourteen years of negotiations, a South Korea-Japan
treaty was concluded in 1965 to normalize relations. It was
clear that this treaty would have tremendous effects on Koreans
in Japan, legally and socially. It would create a new environ-
ment in which Koreans would struggle to improve their livelihood
and to develop and maintain ties to their respective homelands.
This study will make a useful contribution if it succeeds
in highlighting the problems encountered by Koreans in Japan,
because the peaceful solution of those problems is essential
to the continuing peace and stability of Northeast Asia.
Chapter I analyzes the historical events beginning with the
first migration of Koreans to Japan, showing the number of
emigrants, their places of origin, their occupations, interest
groups, and affiliation with Japanese organizations, their

impact on Japanese society, and the cultural influence felt by
Koreans in Japan.
Chapter II deals with the legal position of Koreans in
Japan, the treaty on basic relations, the legal status and
treatment of Koreans in Japan, Japan's organization for dealing
with Koreans, and laws and administrative measures regulating
the conduct of Koreans.
Chapter III examines the political and economic position
of Koreans in Japan after the South Korean-Japan Treaty of
1965, comparing the revenue and taxes of the Japanese with the
Korean residents, and the occupations held by Koreans after
the treaty.
Chapter IV deals with the Korean ties with their homeland;
with the North or the South; analyzing their influence on
Korean policies.
Chapter V analyzes the Korean residents' contributions to
Korean economy, and discusses Japanese investments in South or
North Korea
.
Chapter VI presents the summary and concluding observations.
The hypothesis is that the socioeconomic condition of the Korean
residents in Japan has not improved materially through the years
Despite recent progress, Korean residents still suffer from
informal sanctions within the Japanese economy. The possibility
of increasing legal, economical, and social assimilation,




A. THE PERIOD OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION
According to the Nihol Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (A Statistical
Yearbook of the Japanese Empire) , which was compiled by the
Bureau of Vital Statistics, Home Ministry of Japan in 1885,
there was only one Korean resident in Japan. By 1909, the
year before the Japanese annexation of Korea, there were
126,168 Japanese living in Korea but only 790 Koreans living
in Japan. The major emigration of Koreans to Japan began
around 1910.
Most Koreans emigrated to Japan from Pusan, the southern
seaport in Korea, although no official census exists which
would give exact numbers. In Japan, obtaining information on
immigration was comparatively easy. A census was taken in
the 1920's, 1930 's, and 1940's. In addition, the Security
Police Bureau of the Home Ministry conducted an independent
survey formulating statistical data of these periods in the
2form of a census. The "Overall Study of Koreans in Japan"
was compiled using these two statistical studies of Korean
immigrants. This was a detailed analysis of the natural
increase and decrease in the Korean population over the
period from 1910 to 194 5.
The table following indicates the number of Koreans in
two separate groups: (1) those who were already in Japan,




SURVEY OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
1910-1945
Year Residents Emigrants Year Residents Emigrants
1910-13 3,952 3,952 1931 437,519 12,621
1914 4,176 168 1932 504,176 59,871
1915 5,046 802 1933 573,896 61,995
1934 639,651 56,472
1916 7,225 2,082 1935 720,818 71,465
1917 17,463 10,003
1918 27,340 9,507 1936 780,528 49,204
1919 35,995 8,171 1937 822,214 30,619
1920 40,755 4,211 1938 881,347 47,270
1939 1,030,394 135,177
1921 48,774 7,362 1940 1,241,315 194,213
1922 82,693 32,806
1923 112,051 27,850 1941 1,469,230 208,139
1924 168,002 53,690 1942 1,625,054 133,951
1925 187,102 16,582 1943 1,768,180 119,326
1944 1,911,307 117,401





Source: Overall Study of Koreans in Japan , Pak Chae- il, pp. 29-
Korean residents in Japan totaled only 3,9 52 persons in 1913
However, by 194 5 the population had increased to 2.1 million.
During the thirty-six year occupation of Korea by the Japanese,
the number of Korean emigrants to Japan had reached nearly
2 million. It was an astounding phenomenon. It could be
explained as the direct result of Japanese colonialist policies.
Clearly, the exportation of Koreans as analogous to the exporta-
tion of rice, minerals, and other raw materials, which were
3carried on under the occupational authorities. Most of the
12

emigrants during this period were laborers who had been forced
to leave their homeland.
During the early 1900 's but especially after the Japanese
annexation of Korea in 1910, several hundred Korean students
went to Japan to study the philosophy and industrial techniques
of Western civilization. Korea did not have enough colleges,
or even high schools, to satisfy the needs of students hungry
for the new knowledge. The Confucian-style schools of the Yi
dynasty (1392-1910) were suppressed by the Japanese after
annexation and the high schools established by the Japanese
could not begin to absorb all Korean students who wished to
4
attend. Students were attracted to Japan rather than to
other nations because of its proximity to Korea, the similarity
of language, and the opportunity to obtain part-time employment.
Tokyo had become the intellectual center of East Asia and many
young Koreans who could afford it settled there to continue
their education.
One of the best known student leaders of the period was
Yi Kwang-su, whose radical idealism epitomized the spirit of
Korean nationalism among the Korean residents in Japan which,
in turn, encouraged some of the Korean nationalist leaders to
proclaim the declaration of independence on March 1, 1919, in
Seoul.
The Korean laborers* migration to Japan took place over
three distinct periods. During the first period, from 1910
to 1925, a great number of Koreans were persuaded and encouraged
by the Japanese to go to Japan. The number of emigrants reached
160,000, about 9.2 percent of the total emigrants. From 1910 to
13

1919, however, the number of emigrants dropped to a mere
30,000. Although many Japanese enterpreneurs visited Korea to
recruit badly needed factory workers, there had been only a
small number of applicants from the Korean population. However,
during the latter half of this period, especially after 1920,-
this situation changed drastically. Consequently, during 1922-
23, approximately 30,0 00 new emigrants went to Japan, mostly
farmers who had lost their farm lands and their livelihood.
The Japanese government carried out an extensive land
survey between 1910 and 1918 under the theme, "The Modernization
of Korean Economy." Although Korean farmers were instructed to
register their land within a specified time, since many of them
were illiterate, they did not understand the procedure and lost
title to their land to either local Korean landlords or to
Japanese who, in turn, enriched themselves by filing claims to
7the lands.
The second period, from 19 26 to 19 38, was the period during
which many Koreans were forced to go to Japan. New emigrants
reached 60,000, comprising 32.6 percent of the total. "The
Increased Rice Production Plan," begun in 19 20 by the Japanese
Governor General in Korea was, for all practical purposes, an
attempt to control the Korean agrarian economy, thereby placing
it under colonial capitalism. Poor harvests, coupled with the
drastic lowering of the price of rice by the Japanese, affected
the livelihood of many Korean farmers. The farmers often found
themselves unable to pay for fertilizer with the money they
received from the sale of rice. They were near starvation, and
many desired to leave such miserable living conditions to seek
o
a new life in Japan.
14

During this period, the following scenes were
prevalent through the farm villages in the south.
A great number of desolute farmers would come to
the village police station hundreds of times,
year after year. If they had relatives already
living in Japan, they would try everything
possible to procure documents to go to Japan.
As soon as these documents (so-called the ocean
crossing documents) were obtained, they would
liquidate whatever little they had possessed to
pay for the passage to Japan. With what little
remained (usually a very minimal amount of money)
,
they would sail to Japan, en masse. In front of
the Marine Police Station in Pusan, a gateway port
in Korea, one could see a never ending line of
people in white. (White clothing was tradition-
ally worn by the commoners and the farmers.)
Mainly, in the densely populated Korean district
in the cities in the Kansai region in Japan (Kobe
—
Osaka) , a large number of these poverty-stricken
people began to congregate. Many Koreans who
drifted out of this over-populated area often
sought their lodgings in the streets and in the
other outdoor areas, and roamed around like
gypsies. These later were to become familiar and
typical scenes in the various parts of the Korean
communities in Japan.
In 19 28, the year of the worst rice harvest in Korea,
nearly 9 0,000 farmers emigrated to Japan. The status of Korean
laborers improved somewhat as they had proven themselves valuable
to Japanese industry during the Sino-Japanese war.
It was during the third period, from 1939 to 1945, that a
larger number of Koreans had been forcibly sent to Japan. Of
the 1.23 million Koreans sent during this period, 820,000 had
been conscriptees, while the other 41,000 represented new
emigrants. However, beginning in 1943, approximately 160,000
Koreans were repatriated, leaving a net 1.06 million people,
comprising about 58.2 percent of the total emigrants.
Japan's 1940 census put the number of Koreans in Japan at
1,241,315 and most of them, 96 percent, were attracted by job




KOREAN POPULATION IN JAPAN
Year
On the basis of
census reports













Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren I r " 19.
TABLE III
REASONS GIVEN FOR MIGRATING TO JAPAN
(Tokyo, 1934)
Reason Householder Single
Schooling 26 1.35 208 11.79
Poverty 716 37.04 464 26.28
Labor 354 18.32 106 6.00
Making Money 774 40.04 735 41.62
Job Opportunity 16 0.83 217 12.29
Other 47 2.42 36 2.02
1,933 100.00 1,766 100.00
Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren I," p. 19.
The majority of laborers worked in the mines, representing
nearly 30 percent of the total coal miners in Japan. They
were treated harshly and lived in segregated slums. They often
found themselves in the role of scapegoats for the dissatisfac-
tions among the Japanese population, being held responsible
12for situations with which they had nothing to do. Since the
majority of Korean emigrants were illiterate or semi-illiterate
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by the Japanese. They were labeled unscrupulous, untrustworthy,
and base. The Japanese came to regard all Koreans as undesirables
To these illiterate and economically disadvantaged Koreans, with
their characteristic attire and manners, the contempt and the
discriminatory attitude of the Japanese was an insurmountable
problem. Further, the Japanese government contributed the anti-
Korean sentiment by distorting and overemphasizing the revolution-
13
ary and terrorist activities of the Korean patriots in Japan.
B. AFTER WORLD WAR II
When Japan surrendered after World War II, there were about
2.5 million Koreans in Japan, half of whom had been forcibly
14drafted as laborers. The Supreme Commadner for the Allied
Powers (SCAP) facilitated the repatriation of Japanese in Korea
to Japan and of Koreans in Japan to Korea. The number of re-
turnees from Japan to South Korea was 769,146 in March 1946,
16
and increased to 1,030,549 by May 20, 1946. Between August
1945 and August 1947, approximately 1.39 million Koreans left
for South Korea. The SCAP directive of September 22, 1945,
placed monetary and personal property restrictions upon Korean
residents. They were permitted to take home up to 1,000 yen
and only what they could carry as personal possessions. The
SCAP decreed such restrictive measures to half further de-
18terioration of economic conditions in Japan. As a result,
19
more than 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. Of these,
300,000 to 400,000 had emigrated to Japan before 1930 and had
20
settled there permanently. Those who chose to remain in
Japan eventually forfeited their right to be repatriated.
18

Those who chose to remain in Japan gave several reasons:
(1) they had heard about the difficult economic conditions
after the Korean War, (2) there had been a rumor that floods
and epidemics ravaged their homeland, and (3) they were
22
resented by the Koreans who had remained at home.
The Korean residents who returned to North Korea, after
the repatriation program was resumed in December 19 50, con-
23
sisted of 26,427 families totaling 89,692 persons. The
repatriation of Koreans to North Korea was the direct result
of Kim Il-sung's attempt to gain a political diplomatic
victory over South Korea. In August 1958, Kim Il-sung
announced that all Koreans were welcome to return to North
Korea from Japan, pleding to pay for the entire repatriation.
The repatriation of the Koreans to North Korea, which consti-
tuted the first such movement from a democratic society to a
communist nation, raised many doubts as to its motivation.
However, as a result of the so-called "Homecoming Program"
undertaken jointly by the North Korean authorities and
Chosoren (Zainichi Chosen j in Sorenkai in Japanese; Chochongnyon
in Korea, a pro-North Korea faction in Japan) for Koreans in
Japan who had been subjected to unfair treatment and segre-
gation by the Japanese, approximately 100,000 Koreans were
shipped to North Korea during the 1959-1975 period. (See
Table V.)
Most Koreans who left Japan for North Korea had been
listed as very ill, or on welfare in Japan. Pyongyang and
Chosoren launched a political campaign under the slogan
"repatriation to North Korea" to replenish North Korea's
19

labor force and acquire equipment and machinery by carrying
them away to North Korea as the personal effects of the




REPATRIATION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN TO NORTH KOREA
(December 14, 1959-December 5, 1975)
No . of No. of




Agreement Period 1962 16 3,497
(lst-166th 1963 12 2,567






















Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of South
Korea.
The repatriation of Korean residents in Japan to North
Korea continued in the face of strong protests from the Seoul
government. Abuse of the project for espionage and provocative
20

purposes in collusion with Chosoren touched off controversies.
The Japanese government tried to justify its actions on the
ground of humanitarian free choice of domicile; however, the
repatriation of Koreans to North Korea, to some extent,
relieved the pressing problems of providing for these Koreans




PERCENTAGE OF THOSE KOREANS REPATRIATED
TO NORTH KOREA WHO HAD BEEN ON WELFARE
(December 1961)
Year Year







Source: Japanese Justice Ministry
TABLE VII
OCCUPATION OF MALE ADULTS REPATRIATED TO NORTH KOREA
(December 1961)
Occupation Number Occupation Number
4,528 Restaurant,
2,014 catering 313













Source: Japanese Justice Ministry
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The initial accord on repatriating Koreans in Japan to
North Korea was reached in April 19 59 at a conference in
Geneva of representatives from the Japanese Red Cross and the
North Korean Red Cross, followed by the signing of "Agreements
Between the Japanese Red Cross and the North Korean Red Cross
on the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan" in Calcutta on
27August 13. According to the Japanese Red Cross statement
on June 26, 19 59, approximately 75 percent of the Koreans
who were registered to return to North Korea were unemployed
in spite of promised employment, education, and decent living
28
conditions in North Korea.
Although the majority of the repatriates originally came
from South Korea (See Table XIV) , the uncertain economic and
political situation in South Korea at that time made it un-
attractive as a future home.
In complying with their long-standing policy of assimilat-
ing or deporting Korean residents in Japan, the Japanese
government seemingly obliged the persistent demand of North
Korea and Chosoren. In January 19 59, Japanese Foreign
Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama announced that his government
would settle the question of repatriating Koreans as soon as
possible, in accordance with the international practice of
free choice of country. In February, the Japanese cabinet
decided to entrust the International Red Cross with the task
of confirming the will of prospective repatriates and offer-
ing necessary good offices— a development that fully complied
29
with the intention of Chosoren.
22

On the other hand, Pyongyand had its own reasons for pro-
ceeding with repatriation to North Korea. When Chosoren
initially proposed repatriation, the Pyongyang government
showed little interest except in accepting technicians or
scientists required for the economic rehabilitation of North
Korea. In June 19 58, when the First Five-Year Plan for
Development of People's Economy was undertaken, demand for
more workers increased suddenly. Loss of many lives during
the war depleted North Korea of its labor force; in addition,
the imminent withdrawal of Chinese troops, who had been put
to work rebuilding the war-torn country, threatened a further
30drain on manpower.
It was against such a background that the repatriation
of Korean residents in Japan was carried out. The repatriation
agreement was to expire in 15 months but it was renewed year
after year between Japan and North Korea and continues to the
present.
In the beginning, Soviet vessels were mobilized to
transport the Korean expatriates. As the number of applicants
for repatriation decreased, Soviet vessels were replaced by
North Korean vessels. From 1960 to 1961, Soviet vessels
carried repatraites twice a week, numbering between 2,000 to
5,000 per month. In 1962, however, the number of repatriates
dropped to 300 a month; in 196 3, it fell to a mere 200 a
31
month. (See Table V.) The reason for the decrease in
returnees to North Korea and those who cancelled their appli-
cation was primarily their realization that their homeland
was a far cry from heaven. More and more people came to see
23

the reality, that food and shelter were not readily available
and many repatriates were sent to concentration camps to do
32hard labor. /Among those repatriated to North Korea there
were approximately 6,000 Japanese wives. Requests from these
Japanese wives of Koreans to return to Japan have not been
33granted by the North Korean authorities.
As of March 19 59, the number of Korean residents in Japan
was 613,811 out of the 680,364 permanent alien residents
34
registered by the Japanese government. In 1971, less than
1 percent of the country's residents were of non-Japanese
origin; registered foreigners that year were 718,79 5 of
which 622,690 were Koreans, constituting about 87 percent of
35
all foreigners. During subsequent eyars, the number of
Korean residents in Japan increased: 629,089 in 1972; 636,346
in 1973; and 642,717 in 1975. 36 (See Tables VIII., IX.)
TABLE VIII







No. of Households 152,845






































DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(August 1975)




















































































































Source: Japanese Justice Ministry
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In early times Korean residents in Japan were heavily con-
centrated in mine-rich Fukuoka and Hokkaido. Many of them
moved to such light industry areas as Hyogo and Aichi Prefectures
Table IX indicates that Osaka, a center of commerce and industry,
attracted many of them. Those working in mining and odd jobs
outnumbered all others but as time went by, an increasing number
of the residents engaged in engineering, industry, commerce and
agriculture, showing that they managed to achieve relative
37
security in living. (See Tables X, XI, XII.)
In analyzing the percentage ratio of occupations held by
the Korean residents in Japan from 1940 to 19 52, it is noted
in Tables X, XI, XII, that Mining, Industry, and Construction
showed a decrease of 47.6 percent, and Agriculture and Trans-
portation, a decrease of 14.9 percent. Conversely, in Commerce,
there was an increase of 3.6 percent, and in Jobless and
Others, an increase of 4 8.9 percent. This indicates the changes
in the occupations held by Koreans after World War II. The
reason nearly 60,000 Korean residents lost their jobs in 1952
was primarily: (1) decrease of labor demand in such areas as
Mining, Industry, and Construction; and (2) the fact that many
sought opportunities in Commerce and Trade. This is an indica-
tion that the economic conditions of most Korean residents in
Japan did not change greatly since the 19 30's. The jobless
status of Korean residents did not seem to be temporary but





Breakdown of Occupations Held by Korean Residents
Before tf.W. II.
(1940)
Occupation 1920 70 1930 % 1940 cf
Agriculture/Forestry 1,287 3-7 20,053 7*7 27,511 5.2
Fishery 594 1.7 1,444 0.5 4,094 0.8
Mining 5,53^ 15.8 16,304 6.3 68,636 13.1
General Industry 12,138 34.5 74,396 28.6 179,976 34.3
Construction 7,290 20.8 63,770 24.6 100,258 19.1
General Commerce 1,215 3.4 17,892 6.9 32,104 6.3
Second Hand Goods Store 38,104 7.3
Service/Ear 558 1.6 8,956 3.* 6,914 1.3
Transportation M13 11,7 20,985 8.1 36,233 7.0
Public Service 372 1.0 1,465 0.5 10,848 2.1
Domestic 4 3,363 1.3 4,224 0.8
Day Laborer .2,109 5.8 19,125 7.4 13,927 20.7
Others 12,247 4.7
Sub Total 35,214 100.0 260,010" 100. 523,293 100.0
62.0 427TJob Holders 66.4
Jobless 1,441]
(living on Income) 81 r













Dependents 4,100 10.0 134,060 31.9 539,^2 43.4
Grand Total 40,755 100.0 419,009 100.0 1241,315 100.0




Breakdown of Occupations Held by Korean Residents
After WW. II.
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Total 237,997 89,346 327,3^3 61.1
Dependents 64,304 144,157 20d,46l 38.9
Grand Total 302,301 233,503 535,804 100.0




Comparison of Occupations Held by Koreans in Japan
Before and After WW. II.
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Koreans in Japan were greatly affected by the Korean War
in 1950. The conflict in their homeland, in turn, intensified
the political differences among Koreans in Japan. They were
divided into two major factions, each separately favoring
either North or South Korea.
The Minsen (Korean United Democratic Front in Japan)
,
which subsequently was dissolved to form the Chosoren (see
Table XIII) , a pro-North Korean faction, had spread propaganda
defending the actions of North Korea. It also raised funds
for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and sent letters
of encouragement to its troops. Gradually, it formed close
ties with the Japanese Communist Party. Throughout 19 51 and
the first half of 1952, riots between Communists and the
Japanese police increased in industrial areas. Japanese
Communists and Korean supporters of Kim Il-sung usually formed
the core of these disturbances. When the Minsen cooperated
even more closely with the Japanese Communist Party after the
Korean armistice in July, 19 53, the Japanese government
increased its security control over Koreans in Japan. However,
by 1954, Korean communists in both Japan and North Korea began
to feel that the Minsen' s preoccupation with revolution in
Japan was a mistake. Consequently, the Minsen was dissolved
in May 1955. 38
Even after the Korean War, the political configuration of
Korean organizations in Japan has remained basically unchanged.
Whether pro-North or pro-South Korean faction, or neutral, each
group had contacts with Japanese organizations that supported
30

their activities, all closely connected with the politics of
the Korean peninsula. The result was that the pro-North and
39
the pro-South factions were unable to agree on any issue.
The Chosoren (see Table XIII) , which was organized in May
19 55, is the pro-North group and is the larger faction of the
two. It is under the direct control of North Korea, and was
created to replace Minsen. Although Chosoren maintained its
connection with the Japanese communist movement, unlike the
old Minsen, it pursued its own self-interests and did not
allow itself to be used. The two main themes of Chosoren
were to protect the livelihood of Koreans in Japan and to
promote the aims of North Korea. According to the Ministry
of Justice in January 1965, 349,407 Koreans were registered
under Chosun (North Korea) and 230,072 under Hanguk, loyal
40
to South Korea. However, a look at the places of origin
of these Koreans in Japan shows that the largest number came
from Kyongsang-namdo , the second and third largest groups
coming from Kyongsang-pukto and Cholla-namdo , followed by
Cholla-pukto and Chungchong-namdo . In other words, rural
people from southern provinces accounted for most of the
Koreans in Japan. Far smaller numbers originated in Kyonggi-
do and the northern provinces. In summary, over 90 percent
of Koreans in Japan were from South Korea. (See Table XIV.)
Under the leadership of Han Duk-su, the goals of Chosoren
were: (1) the peaceful unification of Korea, (2) the pro-
tection of Korean racial rights, (3) the promotion of racial
education, and (4) the normalization of relations between










September 8 f 1949
Organized October 15, 1945
Forced
Dissolution September 8, 1949





Organized January 9, 19 51
Dissolved May 26, 1955
"CHOSOREN" (in Japanese)
"CHOCHONGNYON" (in Korean)
Organized May 26, 1955
Affiliated Groups and Organizations in Japan
1. Chosen Youth League
2. Chosen Democratic Republic Women's League
3. Chosen j in Educational Committee
4. Chosenjin Teachers League
5. Chosenjin Scientist Organization
6. Chosen Writers and Artists League
7. Chosen Language Publishers Committee
8. Chosen Students in Japan League
9
.
Chosen Commerce and Industry Cooperation
10. Chosenjin Credit Association (Union) Committee
11. Chosenjin Athletic Organization
12. Unification of Chosen Committee
13. Chosenjin Buddhist Organization
14. Chosen Shim-po-sha (Communication)
15. Chosen Tsu-shinsha (Communication)
16. Ku-wol Publishers
17. Gaku-u Publishers
18. Chosen Pictorial Publications
19 Chosen Central Artists Troupe
20. Chosen Opera Troupe
21. "Chosen" Central Lyceum
22. Tokai Commerce Corporation
23. Chosen University, elementary, middle and high schools
Source: An Inner Aspect of the Chosoren Education in Communism,




PLACE OF ORIGIN OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
(As of April 1, 1974)













































Source: Japanese Justice Ministry
propaganda network, periodicals, newspapers, books and maga-
zines, but also import various publications directly from
North Korea.
A major item in the education budget of the North Korean
government has been the support of a school system maintained
for Korean residents in Japan. Through the Korean Red Cross
Society, the government transmitted payments to the Central
Educational Association of Koreans in Japan, an affiliate






EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND SCHOLARSHIP FUNDS
RECEIVED BY CHOSOREN AND MINDAN
Year Mindan Chosoren















Source: Jeon Joon, "A Study of Chosoren II," p. 197
.
Yoosang Rhee, "A Study of Overseas Education,"
pp. 35-36.
In 1974, there were approximately 170,000 school age children
in Japan. Of these, about 134,000 students attended Japanese
schools (80%) , and 35,000 (18%) attended the Chosoren-affiliated
schools. The distribution and the number of students in the





THE NUMBER OF KOREAN STUDENTS
ATTENDING MINDAN-AFFILIATED SCHOOLS
(July 1, 1974)
Schools Tokyo Osaka Kyoto KenkokuSchool
(Neutral)
Kindergarten 82
Elementary 172 247 130
Middle 127 95 49 133
High Schools 219 122 118 335
TOTAL 518 54 6 167 598
Source: The Sociological-Historical Characteristics of
Koreans in Japan, from the "Society of the Korean
Residents of Today/ 1 Koo-hong Lee, p. 43.
TABLE XVII























Source: "A Study of Overseas Education," p. 37, Yoosang Rhee
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Han Duk-su, Chairman of the Central Standing Committee
of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan,
announced on December 22, 1978 the 70th installment of the
education aid fund and stipends sent to Kim Il-sung for the
development of the democratic national education of the Korean
42
residents in Japan. The 500 million yen ($1 million) was
sent for the children of Korean residents in Japan. Thus,
for more than 20 years since 19 57, the total education aid
fund in the amount of 25,862,827,033 yen ($51,725,654.00) was
43
received by Chosoren. These funds were distributed in the
form of school grants and student scholarships.
Consequently, a complete system of education was offered,
from nursery school to training at Chosen University in Tokyo.
Schools followed the same basic program and structure as those
in North Korea and included over 35,000 students (see Tables
XVI, XVII) . Communist ideology, including the description of
Americans and Japanese as imperialist aggressors, was empha-
sized in the curricula. Japanese authorities have attempted
to control the system; however, in 19 74 the communist and
socialist parties and allied organizations of Japan had
successfully blocked passage of legislation which would have
placed this system under the control of the central Japanese
government and it into conformity with the Japanese
44
school system.
Among the Japanese political parties which support the
activities of Chosoren are: The Japanese Communist Party,
the Japanese Socialist Party, and the Komeito. These parties
extend their strong support to Kim Il-sung 's Chuche
36

(Self-reliance) government in North Korea. Further, they
support the policy of Kim Il-sung to unify Korea, to strengthen
ties between Japan and North Korea, to develop North Korea, and
45
to protect the human rights of Korean residents in Japan.
The Mindan, which was established on October 3, 1946, under




"SHINCHOSEN KENSETSU DO-MEI" "CHOSEN KENKOKU SOKUSHIN
SEINEN DO-MEI"
Organized January 20, 1946
Dissolved October 3, 1946
Organized November 16, 1945
Dissolved August 29, 19 50
"MINDAN"
Organized: October 3, 1946
Affiliated Groups and Organizations in Japan
1. Kankoku Youth League (Organized August 29, 19 50)
2. The League of Korean Students in Japan
3. Korean Soldiers Committee in Japan (Organized August 15, 19 51)
4. Korean Women's Committee in Japan (Organized June 15, 19 51)
5. Korean Athletic League in Japan
6. Korean Commerce and Industry Cooperation
7. Korean Education Suporters' Association
8. Korean Education Committee
9. Korean Credit Association (Union) Committee
Source: An 80-Year History of Korean Residents in Japan, Sang-




In reply to the North Korean propaganda campaign, Mindan
launched one of its own, condemning the aggression and "Red
Imperalism" of North Korea. During the Korean War, several
hundred young Mindan supporters left for Korea and joined
46
the South Korean army. The membership, including affiliated
47groups, was 230,072 as of January 1965. Due partly to the
South Korean government's sustained endeavors to protect the
rights and interests of Koreans in Japan since the normaliza-
tion of diplomatic relations, and with disillusionment over
the idolization of Kim Il-sung (which has been forced upon
Chosoren members) , including number of Koreans dissociated
themselves from Chosoren and affiliated with Mindan.
Mindan was similar to Chosoren: (1) it was dedicated to
promoting the welfare of Koreans living in Japan, and (2)
it was strongly anti-Japanese. However, unlike Chosoren,
Mindan received very little financial or moral support from
South Korea. This situation changed after the Pak Chung-hee
takeover of the South Korean government in April 1960 (see
Table XV)
.
From its inception, Mindan was the weaker of the two
factions. It was organized under the leadership of a middle
class group, who no longer identified with the majority of
the Koreans in Japan. Unlike Chosoren, it lacked a strong
ideology to unite the majority of the Koreans. The lack of
a set goal, intense factionalism, and its inability to capture
the support of Korean residents caused Mindan to occupy a
second position. Thus, when an earlier faction, Choren, was
38

dissolved by government decree in September 1949, Mindan
48lost its great change to surpass its rival, Chosoren.
The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is supporting the
activities of the Mindan-affiliated organizations in Japan
49
and South Korea. It played a supportive role in promoting
an early conclusion of the South Korea-Japan treaty and made
a major capital investment in South Korea to strengthen its
economy. (See Chapter V.)
Chosoren and Mindan are dividing the Korean community in
Japan into two groups causing serious confrontation between
the Korean residents there. The ideological clashes and




II. THE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN TREATY OF 196 5
A. THE LEGAL POSITION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
The normalization of relations between South Korea and
Japan was accomplished in Tokyo on June 22, 196 5, after
fourteen years of negotiations. The treaty restored diplo-
matic relations between the two countries for the first time
since the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. Fifty-five
years had passed since the annexation, including thirty-six
years during which Korea was under Japanese colonial rule.
(See Appendix for the text of the Treaty.)
On August 14, 196 5, the South Korean Congress ratified
the South Korea-Japan Treaty (despite a boycott from the
opposition party of -two members) : one hundred ten
voted for, none voted against, and one abstained.
The Japanese Diet ratified the treaty on November 12,
1965, the representatives from both nations officially
exchanged the ratified documents and the South Korea-Japan
Treaty became effective. South Korea and Japan had begun
. . 52preliminary talks on October 20, 19 51.
Besides the Treaty on Basic Relations, the important
agreements that required ratification were the Agreement on
the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims
and Economic Cooporation, the Agreement on Fisheries and
Peace Line, the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment
of Korean residents in Japan, and the Agreement on Art
Objects and Cultural Cooperation. In addition to these




The preliminaries in October 19 51 were the first official
contact between the two countries after the defeat of Japan.
The talks were urged and arranged by General Douglas MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) , after the San
Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan had been signed but before it
took legal effect on April 18, 19 52. Both sides agreed to place
the following issues on the agenda: the legal status and
treatment of Koreans residing in Japan and the question of
title to vessels in Korean harbors at the time of the Japanese
54
surrender on August 9, 194 5. However, South Korea's request
to include the fisheries issue was refused by Japan. In late
19 51, the preliminary talks were suspended, no progress having
been made in resolving the issues.
The first formal South Korea-Japan conference (February-
April 1952) discussed the issues concerning basic (or diplomatic)
relations; South Korea's claims to compensation for losses of
property and lives under Japanese rule; and Japanese claims to
compensation for property formally held in Korea, in addition
to the issues already opened to discussion in the preliminary
talks. The Treaty of Basic Relations was in reality a treaty
of friendship and trade.
During successive conferences, a number of important issues
were added. They were the Peace Line (or Rhee Line, as it is
called by Japan) : the question of title to Dokto (Takeshima
in Japanese), which consists of two small islands; South Korea's
demand for the return of Korean art objects removed to Japan;
the fate of Japanese fishermen interned in South Korea for
violation of the Peace Line, and of the Koreans detained in
41

the Japanese detention camp in Ohmura, Japan; the repatriation
of Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea; and, above all,
the question of "two Koreas" and jurisdictional control of the
57South Korean government in the Korean peninsula.
B. THE TREATY OF BASIC RELATIONS
The South Korean government insisted that a Japanese apology
for the unfortunate past be formalized in a treaty that Japan
explicitly recognize that the unfortunate past between the two
countries was due mainly to the immoral and illegal Japanese
occupation of Korea; and that Japan specifically repudiate all
previous treaties or agreements that had subjugated the old
58
empire of Korea into a part of the Japanese colonial empire.
On October 22, 1948, immediately after South Korea became
independent, President Rhee said, "We are trying to forget
and will forget the past. If the Japanese would meet the
Koreans with truthfulness and sincerity, friendly relations
would be renewed. We believe in peaceful coexistence with a
59
neighboring country." President Rhee suggested normalization
of trade relations between the two countries as the first
step toward normalization of diplomatic relations, even before
a peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the Allied
powers
.
Finally, the Korean insistence on an official apology
from Japan was satisfied. On February 17, 196 5, Foreign
Minister Shiina Etsusaburo came to Seoul to initiate a tenta-
tive draft of Treaty on Basic Relations and said, "I... really
regret an unfortunate period existed in the long history of
fi
the two nations, and deeply reflect on such a past."
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The South Korea-Japan Treaty was in itself a unique treaty
dealing with fundamental issues, for which there was no histori-
cal precedent. The treaty was, for all practical purposes, one
of the peace treaties. After Korea was annexed by the Japanese
in 1910, and until it gained independence after World War II,
Korea had been under Japanese colonial rule. In order to replace
the past relationship between the two nations, a step had to be
taken to establish new directions.
The Treaty on Basic Relations of June 22, 1965, specified:
1. both countries would exchange diplomatic missions
and establish ambassadorial and embassy relations;
2. all the treaties and agreements concluded prior to
August 22, 1910, between the two countries were null
and void (Article II)
.
In Article III, the government of South Korea, "as specified
on No. 195 (III), of the resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly ,... (was acknowledged as) the sole lawful government
of Korea." 61
On the matter of South Korea's claim in divided Korea, the
treaty recognized South Korea as the sole lawful government as
fi 2it was speciried in the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly.
Further, the South Korean government maintained that it was the
only legitimate government representing the whole of Korea and
its administrative and jurisdictional control covered not only
fi 3
the Korean peninsula but all of the offshore islands.
C. THE LEGAL STATUS AND TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
The problems of the Korean minority in Japan formed an im-
64portant chapter in the history of the Korea-Japan negotiations.
43

In an attempt to clarify the status of the Koreans for
administrative purposes, on November 20, 1946 the SCAP decreed
that Koreans in Japan were to be treated as Japanese nationals.
The Koreans refused to accept that status, however, and demanded
equality with Allied nationals in Japan. Consequently, in June
194 8, the SCAP accorded the Koreans a special status— "semi-
independent" from the Japanese nationality. The SCAP further
increased the uncertainty when, in a memorandum to the Japanese
authorities on June 27, 19 50, he stated that the status of
Koreans was undetermined until such time as the South Korean
government and Japan should conclude an agreement following
the Peace Treaty.
In the meantime, Japan had enacted the Alien Registration
Law of May 2, 194 7, which required Koreans to register as
nationals of either "Chosen" (North Korea) or "Kankoku" (South
Korea) . On April 28, 19 52, the Japanese government enacted
Law No. 126, which permitted continued residence to those
Koreans who had entered Japan prior to September 2, 1945,
until such time as their status and the period of their stay
6 fi
might be determined by some future law. Thus, the status of
the Koreans in Japan remained uncertain. They were sometimes
referred to as "nationals of a third country," or treated as
foreigners or nationals of Japan.
In October 19 51, when South Korea and Japan opened nego-
tiations, the basic position of South Korea was as follows:
1. In determining the status of Koreans in Japan, the
unique historical circumstance of their existence in Japan
must be the foremost consideration.
44

2. Given this circumstance, a favorable legal status unique
among aliens in Japan should be given to the Koreans, with the
privilege of permanent residence for themselves and their
descendants and with freedom to remove their personal property
and funds to the Republic of Korea when they choose to return
there.
3. Koreans in Japan should be accorded the same privilege
and opportunity in matters of education, health, social security,
employment, business activities, and property rights as enjoyed
by Japanese nationals.
4. All Koreans in Japan must be treated as the nationals
of the Republic of Korea under the protection of the Republic
6 7
of Korea (not North Korea)
.
The Japanese recognized the unique origin of Koreans in
Japan, but would not grant favorable legal status and treatment
6 8
to Koreans to the prejudice of other aliens in Japan.
In the first conference in 1952, Japan agreed to classify
all Koreans as nationals of South Korea. Japan strongly favored
doing so, for fear that South Korea might demand Japanese
. . . . 69
citizenship as the right of Koreans m Japan. However, in
subsequent conferences, the main point of discussion was the
right of the Japanese authorities to deport Koreans. Under
the Japanese Immigration Control Ordinance, a Korean could,
for example, be arrested and sentenced to up to one year of
imprisonment for not carrying his alien registration card





Further negotiations on the status and treatment of Koreans
were brought to a standstill by the 1959 mass repatriation by
Japan of Koreans to North Korea. The mass repatriation provided
Japan with a partial solution to the pressing problems of the
Korean minority in the country, but it worsened relations between
71South Korea and Japan.
Under the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of the
Nationals of South Korea residing in Japan as of June 22, 1965,
Japan granted the right of permanent residence to all nationals
of South Korea who entered Japan prior to the end of World War II
(August 16, 1945) and who had resided in Japan continuously from
that date as well as to second and third generation Korean
residents. The agreement also guaranteed that no national of
South Korea would be deported to South Korea unless he was
sentenced in Japan to long imprisonment for serious crimes.
At the same time, the Japanese government authorized the
Koreans to enter the private and public Japanese elementary
schools, high schools, and the higher educational institutions.
A livelihood, social welfare, and health benefits were also
guaranteed. Japan also assured the South Korean government
that it would give "due considration" to the matter of removal
of personal property and remission of funds. Consequently,
those who renounced permanent residence and returned to Korea
72
were allowed to carry or send home up to ten thousand dollars.
The agreement did not clarify the citizenship of Koreans
in Japan. The original Japanese position was to regard all
Koreans in Japan as nationals of South Korea. However, after
the Korean War, Japanese policy changed, and Koreans were
46

registered as the nationals of either "Chosen" or "Kankoku;"
the latter applied only to those who carried identification
73
cards issued by the South Korean Mission in Japan. In either
case, "Chosen" and "Kankoku" were to the Japanese government no
74
more than geographical concepts
.
Koreans registered under "Chosen" were generally regarded
as pro-Communists or neutrals favoring North Korea. Japanese
Minister of Justice Ishii Mitsujiro testified in the Diet that,
as of the end of January 196 5, some 349 , 407 Koreans were
registered under "Chosen" and 230,072 under "Kankoku." How-
ever, the South Korean government's figures were different:
the number of Koreans registered with Mindan (pro-South Korea)
was 230,000 and with Chosoren (pro-North Korea), 170,000;
7 fi
neutrals numbered 175,000.
The division of the Koreans in Japan by ideology or loyalty
was the practical reason for Japan's refusal to assign them a
single nationality, as demanded by South Korea. The agreement
provided, however, that the benefits of this agreement were
available only to those Koreans who presented evidence of
citizenship from South Korea. The South Korean government
anticipated that this agreement, along with normalization of
over-all relations, would immensely strengthen its position
among Koreans in Japan at the expense of North Korea. However,
the Japanese government maintained that the Koreans who would
not register with South Korea and therefore were not eligible
for permanent residence and diplomatic protection of South
Korea, would continue to enjoy the same treatment as they had
77
received in the past.
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In discussing the legal status of Korean residents in Japan,
it must be recalled that they were mobilized for war under
Japanese colonial rule. Japan, however, does not seem to pay
attention to this fact. Schools run by Koreans did not have
equal status with Japanese schools. However, with the normaliza-
tion of relations between South Korea and Japan, the Japanese
government promised to forbid discriminatory treatment against
Korean residents in Japan.
Although the Japanese government does not seem to show
partiality toward Korean residents in Japan on the surface,
they were and are subject to racial discrimination stemming
78from popular sentiments on the part of the Japanese.
The Japanese contend that:
1. Though Japan was defeated in the Pacific War, Korea is
indebted to her. However, Korea does not acknowledge it;
2. Koreans practiced atrocities on Japanese at the time
when the war was over; and
3. Korea joined the Allied Nations in making undue demands
"79
upon Japan.
The Japanese government's discriminatory treatment led many
Korean residents to become naturalized in Japan. Each year,
3,000 to 4,000 Koreans were naturalized on average until 1965
when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations.
Naturalization is continuing though it has decreased sharply in
80
recent years.
Until the legal status of Korean residents in Japan was
established, there existed no definite principles which were
pursued in treating Korean residents. This inconsistency on
48

the part of the Japanese government's treatment of Korean
residents helped the Japanese people to justify their rejection
of Koreans to the disadvantage of Koreans. Since the scope of
their economic activities was limited, Koreans tended to engage
in such speculative jobs as running entertainment facilities
and restaurants.
What is worse, in industry Korean residents in Japan have
been bound by law to pay 20 percent more in taxes than the
Japanese. Koreans earn an average of 40 percent less than
their Japanese counterparts, but they must pay 10 percent more
81in taxes.
This is an obvious reason for the lingering slump of busi-
nesses run by Korean residents in contrast to the rapid growth
of the Japanese economy since the 1960 's. Only 1,300 out of
the 650,000 Korean residents belong to the wealthy class,
accounting for 80 percent of the total income of Koreans in
Japan. Most Koreans in Japan live close to the subsistence
level
.
D. JAPAN'S ORGANIZATIONS DEALING WITH KOREANS
Among the various organizations in Japan which deal with
Koreans, the fo lowing administrative organizations facilitate
their stay in Japan.
The administration of entry and exit control of Korean
residents is under the Entry Administrative Office of the
General Ministry of Justice. Under this office are the local
entry control offices, their branches, and other facilities.
The entry control station of the Ministry of Justice is
49

headed by its administrative chief, the assistant, and the
secretary, and consists of six sections:
1. The General Affairs Department. This office handles
the overall planning of entry and exit control, drawing up laws
and ordinances, maintaining liaison with each related branch,
investigation analysis, collection of information, general
items concerning foreign residents, entry inspection officers,
distribution and regulations of the entry guards, camps to
accommodate the persons who entered the country, and the
entry control offices.
2. The Entry Investigation Section. This office handles
the landing investigation and permits of foreigners, the exit
and return of Japanese, and the supervision of the chiefs of
the vessels which handle the matters concerning entry and exit
and of the transporters.
3. The Qualification Investigation Section. This section
handles the procurement of qualification credentials of the
foreign residents in Japan, the changes and renewal of the
duration of stay, the issuance of permanent resident permits
to foreigners, and the issuance of re-entry permits to foreigners.
4. The Judgment Section. This section handles the investi-
gation of violations, matters concerning the issuance of deportation
orders, the landing of foreigners, the oral investigation of
deportation, the formal objections, and the payment of compensation
to informers.
5. The Defense (Guard) Section. This office handles the
investigation of violations, detention orders, execution of
deportation orders, repatriation of foreigners rescued from the
50

sea, guarding of the detention camp for foreigners, the
temporary release and treatment of detainees, the payment
and repayment of security, and items concerning the weapons
carried by entry guard officers and entry investigation
officers
.
6. The Registration Section. This office handles the
registration of foreigners and the arrangement and storage
of the records pertaining to their entry, exit, and registration
Of the foreigners detained by the entry control office,
Southern Koreans, North Koreans, and Korean residents in Japan
are sent to Ohmura Camp, while other foreigners are sent to
Yokohama Camp to await their repatriation.
51

III. THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
A. CHOSOREN AND THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
From their inception the Japanese Communist Party led and
8 3guided the Choren and the Minsen. The relationship between
the factions and the Japanese Communist Party, however, was
based on the latter' s view that Korean residents were a minority
in Japan, and therefore, quite unlike the colonial ruler-subject
relationship which had existed before 194 5.
The Chosoren, however, demanded that Korean residents be
treated as foreigners, not as a minority race, in Japan. Con-
sequently, at the 6th General Conference of the Japanese
Communist Party, the demand of the Chosoren was acknowledged,
and the relationship between the two groups changed from "lead
and guide" to "active support" by the Japanese Communist Party.
Subsequently, the factions were dissolved and their members
joined other organizations.
Most former faction members joined Chosoren, while a smaller
number were assimilated into the Japanese Communist Party. In
19 55, out of approximately 30,000 former Choren and Minsen
members, approximately 27,000 joined the Chosoren, and 3,000
members joined the Japanese Communist Party. With Han Duk-su
as its leader, the Chosoren began to purge the opposing members
8 5
within the faction.
In February 1959 and again in March 1966, Kenji Miyamoto
visited Pyongyang as a representative of the Japanese Communist
Party. On Miyamoto's first visit, the Miyamoto organization
52

had not been formed, and therefore the visit was chiefly
aimed at establishing friendship between the Pyongyang govern-
ment and the Japanese Communist Party. Consequently, the
problem of the Chosoren was not discussed at the first meeting.
When Miyamoto visited Pyongyang for the second time the
Miyamoto organization was not only securely established but
also considering altering the party's direction in Japan.
Hence, there were differences of opinion between Miyamoto and
Kim Il-sung. Miyamoto pointed out that North Korea's anti-
government guerrilla operations in South Korea were unlikely
to succeed, and criticized Kim Il-sung for carrying out such
operations. Consequently, the Miyamoto-Kim Il-sung debates
8 fi
ended, for all practical purposes.
The relationship between North Korea and the Japanese
Communist Party under Miyamoto cooled considerably and the
relationship between the Japanese Communist Party and the
Chosoren also cooled. The 11th General Conference of the
Japanese Communist Party, in July 1970, also chilled North
Korea and Japanese Communist Party relations. At the con-
ference, the Miyamoto organization changed direction by
replacing the bloody revolutionary form with ' parliamentarianism.
'
On this issue there was a great deal of controversy in Japan.
However, as long as the Miyamoto organization stayed in power,
the Japanese Communist Party followed the policy of 'parliamentar-
ianism. ' Their change of direction was a shock to the North
Korean government and in many of the subsequent reports made
by Han Duk-su the phrase 'the Japanese comrade members' was
87
changed to 'the Japanese working class.'
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In September 1970, Chiki Narita of the Japanese Socialist
Party visited Pyongyang. This visit was a "goodwill and
8 8
friendship" visit.
Originally, the Japanese Socialist Party did not concern
itself much with the problems of Koreans in Japan. While the
Japanese Communist Party was closely associated with the
Korean residents even before World War II, the Japanese
Socialist Party had never studied the Korean resident problems.
The Japanese Socialist Party took a strong position in
opposing the South Korea-Japan Treaty, and against authorizing
the establishment of the Chosen Un ersity but as a party it
was never actively involved with Korean problems. However,
among the Japanese Socialist Party members were some politicians
and scholars who, independently and as individuals, dealt
actively with problems such as the repatriation of Korean
residents and the right to travel freely, and also opposed
bills concerning schools for foreigners and international
89immigration control
.
The indifferent attitude of the Japanese Socialist Party
toward Chosoren did not have any significant impact on Chosoren
as long as the Japanese Communist Party and Chosoren maintained
their close ties. The Japanese Socialists Party's indifferent
attitude toward Chosoren derived from the fact that Chosoren
did not have the 'vote' or the right to vote. Similarly, Mindan,
which did not have the 'vote' or the right to vote, was subjected




B. ECONOMIC STATUS AFTER THE SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN TREATY OF 196 5
With the phenomenal growth in the Japanese economy, one
could speculate that the people would benefit from such
favorable conditions. However, the rate of such growth among
Koreans in Japan was not as significant as that of the Japanese.
The majority of Korean residents were farmers, fishermen,
service, and factory workers. A small number were engaged in
the operational and managerial fields. The following table
indicates the degree of affluence among Korean residents.
TABLE XIX
THE ECONOMIC STRATA OF THE KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN
(1968-1970)
Core Number of Number Ability to






















Source: "A Study of Chosoren II," Jeon Joon, p. 177
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Those in the "Very Wealthy" and the "Wealthy" categories
number approximately 5,200. These could cope with the un-
favorable downturn in the Japanese economy. However, those
who belong in the "Middle Income" category do not have a firm
position for survival. Those in the "Lower Income" and below
can be considered submerged by the Japanese economic waves.
Although the standard of living of Korean residents is
gradually paralleling the rise among the Japanese as a whole,
the gap between the two groups is widening.
Among Korean residents, the salaried people such as tech-
nicians, teachers, and company employees belong to either the
"Middle Income" or the "Lower Income" group. The number of
salaried Koreans is very small in Japan. The majority of them
are employed generally in the business firms operated by
Korean residents, or in the Mindan or Chosoren-operated
organizations. In comparison to their Japanese counterparts,
these Koreans receive lower salaries. For example, teachers
employed by the Mindan schools receive a monthly compensation
of 45,000 Yen and Chosoren school employees 51,000 Yen, while
their Japanese colleagues receive 65,000 Yen. In the business
field, an average monthly salary received by members of the
Mindan organizations was 46,000 Yen, in the Chosoren organiza-
tions 50,000 Yen, compared to 6 8,000 Yen received by Japanese
91in similar occupations. The situation is different in the
professional or technical field; they command pay equivalent
to that of the Japanese. However, such opportunities tend
to be closed to Korean residents.
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Finally, those in the "Extremely Poor" category and
"Others" usually live collectively. Although collective
group living is similar to that prevalent before World War II,
the number of such groups has increased.
Concerning the actual income earned by Korean residents
and the taxes levied on such income, there was, in the first
place, no legislative announcement by the Japanese authorities
regarding the tax rates. Second, the title to the properties
or the business enterprises are usually recorded under the
name of the Japanese spouse. Third, depending upon their
status, whether Japanese citizen or permanent resident, a
different tax rate would apply. Given such a system, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to produce accurate
figures. The following statistics may throw some light on
the situation.
Since 1961, in comparison to the Japanese nationals, the
revenue of Korean residents decreased by 40 percent, while
they paid 10 percent more in taxes. (See Tables XX, XXI.)
Furthermore the Korean residents in industry are in a
very disadvantageous position. In reality, Korean residents
must pay 20 percent more in taxes than the Japanese. This
is due primarily to the fact that there were practically
no provisions made for some of the legal organizations or
industry to qualify them for tax exemptions. Another reason
is that the majority of the Korean residents hold occupations
which would place them under the more heavily taxed category.
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Consequently, as of April 1974, the status of Korean
residents in Japan had not improved economically, accounting















Year (1 ,000, ooo:) Income (Yen) (100,000) (1,000,000) Person
1961 94 15,755.1 167 567 56,901 100
1962 95 17,729.8 186 569 63,633 111
1963 96 20,607.2 214 573 73,715 128
1964 97 23,329.3 240 578 83,327 144
1965 98 26,000.3 264 583 92,611 158
1966 99 30,273.4 305 585 107,325 183
1967 100 35,792.2 357 587 125,772 214
1968 101 42,143.0 415 592 147,835 249
Source: "Annual Report of the Economic Statistics," 1970 Nenkan,
Statistics Department, Japanese Banks.
- The Revenue of the Korean residents was calculated at a figure
lower by 40 percent than the Japanese.
TABLE XXI
TAXES PAID BY THE KOREAN RESIDENTS
Japanese Tax Per
Person





Year (1,000,000) Taxes 1,000 Population 1,000 1,000
(Billion) Yen (100,000) (Yen) (Yen)
1961 94 31,342 33 567 20,748 36
1962 95 34,474 36 569 22,683 39
1963 96 39,446 41 573 25,868 45
1964 97 45,588 46 578 29,852 51
1965 98 48,29-1 49 583 31,534 54
1966 99 54,316 54 585 35,302 60
1967 100 65,463 65 587 42,392 71
1968 101 592





OCCUPATIONAL BREAKDOWNS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(April 1, 1974)






























































Total 336,787 302,019 638,806
Source: Japanese Justice Ministry
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IV. TIES WITH THE HOMELAND
A. THEIR VIEW OF HOMELAND
The number of overseas Koreans is estimated at approxi-
mately 2.5 million, with about one-third scattered in the
United States, Japan, West Germany, Canada and other Free
8 3World countries and the rest in Communist countries. The
number of Korean residents in Japan is approximately 6 50,000
84
at present.
Koreans in Free World countries are those who left Korea
of their own accord for emigration, employment and study,
carrying passports issued by the South Korean government.
Therefore, their attachment to Korea as their homeland is
presumably not much different from those held by the people
of Korea, although some have been naturalized as citizens
of their host countries.
However, Koreans in Japan and Communist countries have a
different attitude toward their homeland. These attitudes are
divisive and complex. The environment in Japan causes them
to develop psychological complications stemming from the
division of their homeland into two different political
systems in the north and south. They are at times confused as
to which side merits their allegiance. As a result, they
feel complications not only about Korea as a geographical area
but also about Korea—North and South—as two separate polities
with different names. Those affiliated with the pro-North
Korean Choseren do not consider Japan as their homeland.
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Japan is not a monolithic society but a free and democratic
society, and thus treats Koreans not as Japanese citizens but
as aliens having ghe right to permanent residence in Japan.
Although these Chosoren-affiliated Koreans may view the
homeland in the context of Communism, they also may have a
spiritual homeland in their minds.
When speaking of national consciousness, one often cites
the examples of Jews, Chinese and Japanese and especially
their national solidarity and pride. Unlike these groups, the
Korean people are not exclusive or militant but are strongly
individualistic and perservering, and they are adaptable and
disunited.
The Korean disposition is attributed to the historical
and geographical environment of Korea. Considering that
Koreans have long lived under foreign rule without losing their
national identify, perserverance is a valuable factor in their
national character.
National consciousness is a complex sense of family, a
sense of living, a sense of thoughts, a sense of system and
organization; and, therefore, it is under the influence of
environmental factors such as society and international
relations
.
There is much evidence that Koreans in Communist countries
have a strong national conscieousness . Foreigners visiting
the Korean Autonomous District in China are surprised that
they maintain the Korean style of living almost completely,
speaking Korean, eating Korean food, living in ondol (hot floor)
rooms and marrying other Koreans. In addition, they publish
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Korean newspapers, and have Korean broadcasting stations and
schools
.
Such a strong national consciousness is also found in the
Korean community in Japan, in spite of its assimilative and
discriminative policies. The result of a survey of Koreans
in Japan concerning their national consciousness is shown in
Table XXIII.
The survey was conducted just prior to the normalization
of South Korea-Japan relations. The legal status of the
persons who answered the questions was uncertain and, accord-
ingly, they were not in a position to pass judgment on their
future problems, including the naturalization of their children
as Japanese citizens. This indicates that Koreans in Japan
have the same strong feelings of national consciousness as
Koreans at home.
Separately, some 1,500 Japanese were asked by Asahi, early
in 1977 their choice of the 'most liked' country (sukina kuni)
.
(See Table XXIV.) The results were as indicated.
The survey indicated that both Koreas were the least liked
countries, and the second and third in the most hated country
ranking behind the Soviet Union.
In general, first-generation overseas Koreans have stronger
national consciousness than second-generation Koreans. This is
due largely to the legal and social systems of the host countries,
and the younger generations are realistic in adapting themselves
to the new systems because public avowal may bring about social
disadvantages and discrimination in their social life. Conse-




NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
(151 persons)
1. Do you take pride in having national consciousness as a Korean in
Japan?
Yes. 80 No. 66 Need not have it. 5
2. Does national consciousness cause any trouble in your daily living?
Yes. 78 No. 22 Don't know. 51
3. Why do you have national consciousness?
Natter of course as a ?Iorean.
.
125
To save my face as a Korean. 16 Hay do without it. 10
if. Is national consciousness necessary to your children?
Yes. k5 No. 35 Don't know. 51
5. Do you want to be naturalized as a Japanese citizen?
Yes. 13 No. 127 Yes. in the future. 11
6. What should be .the nationality of your children?
Korea. 50 Japan. 73 Don't care. 28
7. What if your children show no reaction to national consciousness?
Can't help it. 102 They are wrong. 31 Don't care. 14
8. If you are naturalized as a Japanese citizen, you can visit Korea
more easily, can't you?
Yes. 5 Not always easy. 107
Permanent residence and naturalization are different. 39
9. On what do you base your pride in being a Korean?
Korean culture. 41 Korean history. 51
Korean morality and etiquette. 59
10. Do you respect the Japanese people?
Yes. 13 No. 29 Depends. 109













The question was turned around and asked to name the 'most hated'
country (kirai). Here are the results:









Source: Roger Swearinger, 'The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan' Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California,
1978, pp. 99-102.
into the polities of the countries in which they live. The
following survey appeared in Sankei, in December 1978.
Question: What do you think of having the following
relationship with the South Korean people? (In the survey on
the South Korean side, with the Japanese people.) (The follow-
ing figures give the ratio to the whole of those who replied
"very greatly in favor" and "generally in favor" combined.)
(See Table XXV.)
The survey shows that the 4 3.9 percent of the Japanese who
were interviewed answered that they would like to become close




JAPANESE VS SOUTH KOREAN
Japanese Side Question §ide
h Korean
8.2% To become relatives through marriage 32.3%
43.9% To become close friends, individually 76.0%
33.5% To live nearby, as neighbors 78.2%
37.7% To work as colleagues in the same
workshop 76.5%
31.4% To grant Japanese (South Korean)
nationality 27.1%
60.1% To accept them as travelers 9 3.8%
5.5% Exclusion from Japanese (South Korean) 13.4%
society
Method of Survey
On the Japanese side, questionnaires were distributed to
1,350 persons in Tokyo-to and 1,0 50 persons in Osaka City, with
the objects chosen by the stratified, random-sampling method,
from the first part of September to the middle of September.
On the South Korean side, the survey was conducted through
direct interviews, with 1,000 persons in Seoul City, and 210
persons in Taegu City as the objects, chosen by the same method,
in June of this year.
Source: Sankei (page 5) (Full) December 28, 1978.
in the same workshop. This may be an improvement in their per-
ception of and willingness to accept Koreans in Japan on a more
favorable term.
It may be presumptuous, however, to assume that they are
losing national consciousness as Koreans. As a man cannot be
completely free from the instinctive and eternal character of
his people (as an ethnic group) with changes in the environment
the level of his national consciousness may change.
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B. TIES WITH THE SOUTH
There is an old saying "even tigers look for homes when
dying." All animals have a homing instinct that ties them to
the place of their birth. For Koreans living in Japan, this
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old saying was the bitterest reminder of their plight.
The South Korean government, with the cooperation with the
South-North Red Cross and the South-North Coordinating Committee,
actively supported the movement to help the Chosoren-affiliated
Koreans in Japan visit their homeland. The project is now
making great progress amid enthusiastic support and is welcomed
by people all over the world.
The home visit campaign for Chosoren members brought closer
to reality the goal or arranging the reunion of 10 million di-
vided family members. This historic campaign began when more than
40 Chosoren Koreans entered Pusan on September 13, 1975, the first
group of visitors to pay homage to their ancestors ' tombs on
Chusok Day, the most celebrated traditional holiday. It was the
first visit to their homeland in more than 30 years. The first
group was followed by 20 people arriving the next day, and 6 50
others who flew into Kimpo aboard Korean Air Lines flights on
the 15th and 16th of that month. Young men, who had been taken
away by the Japanese for forced labor or fighting in World War
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II, returned home as gray-haired old men. The homebound visit
which began on Chusok Day in 19 75 brought to South Korea over
8910,000 Chosoren Koreans, as of the New Year's Day, 1977.
Great historical significance can be found in the movement
for home visits by Chosoren Koreans in Japan. This campaign
marked a turning point in north-south relations in Korea. It
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had an immense political meaning in that, for the first time
since the foundation of South Korea, so great a number of pro-
North, Chosoren members visited South Korea. The home visits
by Chosoren members aroused a strong national spirit among
Koreans in and out of the country.
The South Korean government's firm principle of accepting
members of Chosoren is purely a humanitarian project. At the
time of tense political confrontation between the north and
south, only this type of humanitarian movement which spans
political differences can revive love of the nation and restore
mutual trust. The success of the campaign to promote home
visits for Chosoren Koreans privided new confidence in the
future of north-south relations.
C. TIES WITH THE NORTH
Chosoren has dual functions in Japan, as the Japanese
branch of the North Korean Labor Party and as the official
North Korean representative.
At the time Chosoren was organized the North Korean
government supported Han Duk-su and his followers. After
giving power to Chosoren, North Korea insisted that it
dissolve its affiliation with the Japanese Communist Party,
and arm itself with devotion for Kim Il-sung. Based on this,
Chosoren formed an organizational master-servant relationship
with North Korea and assumed the role of front guard base in
Japan for the communist unification of the Korean peninsula.
In conflicts within Chosoren, the dissidents were either sent
to North Korea or purged. Thus, North Korea had Chosoren
adhere closely to their government and, in addition, had the
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had the members pledge their allegiance to Kim Il-sung. In
North Korea the leadership and supervision of Chosoren is the
responsibility of the North Korean Labor Party. In particular,
the anti-South Korea General Business Bureau handles problems
concerning operations in South Korea, while the Resident
General Bureau handles the other administrative affairs.
The North Korean government's guidelines toward Chosoren
are:
1. Chosoren is affiliated with various organizations in
North Korea and, further, heightens its goals of a unified
Korea and loyalty to Kim Il-sung. Chosoren is affiliated with
the 'Democratic Battle Front for the Unification of the
Motherland' of North Korea, and is thus alloted seven seats
as Diet members in the 'Supreme Peoples' Conference.' At the
fifth election, which was held in December 1972, Han Duk-su,
Lee Chin-kyu, Lee Ki-baek, Chung Chae-pil , Hong Bon-su, Yang
Chong-ko and Pak Chung-ku, were elected. On various anniversa-
ries North Korea granted official commendations for the staff
and members and cheered loyal members. For example, in May
1970 (on the fifteenth anniversary of Chosoren) and in April
1972, decorations and meritorious service medals were conferred
on nine hundred and two thousand people, respectively.
2. Each year, North Korea supports Chosoren with large
operational funds. These have been sent to Chosoren in the
form of educational aid and scholarship funds three to five
times a year since April 1957. Further, these funds have
become widely known as Kim Il-sung's "parental appropriation,'
and thus trumpets its loyalty to their great leader. In 1976,
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approximately 200 billion Yen was sent to Chosoren from North
Korea; however, most of the money was spent on the Battle Front
Base as operational funds for the anti-South Korea and Communist
unification.
3. Beginning with the staff and members of Chosoren, and
through visits to North Korea by Korean residents in Japan,
North Korea is carrying out its direct guidance and orders.
When the Japanese government relaxed re-entry laws for
Korean residents in Japan after visiting North Korea, Chosoren
dispatched its staff members on anniversaries and commemorative
occasions, and also allowed residents to visit their ancestral
tombs. Such visitors numbered over one thousand at the end of
1976. During Chosoren members' stay in North Korea, they
receive political lectures and training in 'Chuche' ideas, the
Socialist system, and Chosoren activities. To the members in
the higher echelons, the interviews, training, and words of
encouragement are spoken directly by Kim Il-sung. This is
known to Chosoren as 'the great leader's teachings,' and
these are used as guiding principles for the organization and
activities of Chosoren.
4. When Chosoren 's cargo/passenger ship, 'Mankyung-bong
Ho, 1 stops at Japanese ports, Chosoren affiliated members are
let on board and are given direct guidance. Since August 1971,
each time 'Mankyung-bong Ho' (3,573 tons), entered the ports
of Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, Chairman Han Duk-su,
Chosoren 's staff, and loyal members numbering more than 13,000
were invited aboard and given political lectures.
For all practical purposes "Mankyung-bong Ho' provided
racial and revolutionary education for Chosoren members. In
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addition, Chosoren conducted film viewings , informal discussions,
lecture series, welcoming parties, and tours of the ship with
Chosoren members and the North Korean representatives. In the
Chosoren office, direct instructions to the Chosoren staff
members were carried out in utmost secrecy through instructional
documents and tape recordings
.
In addition, Korean residents maintain their ties with North
Korea through the following organizations in Japan:
1. New Left Wing Power. The two organizations, 'The
Cultured Man of New Democracy, ' and "The Left Wing Radical Student
Group, 1 represent the major new left wing powers in Japan. By
making use of the Kim Dae-jung incident, these organizations
attempted to embitter Japan-South Korea relations, and thus
stood in the forefront of the anti-South Korea movement,
gaining full coopration from the Chosoren.
The New Left Wing Power in Japan, together with the
Chosoren, raised criticism against the South Korean state, and
proposed the abrogation of the South Korea-Japan Basic Treaty,
suspension of U.S. -Japan economic association with South Korea,
and dissolution of Japan-South Korea Cabinet Members' Conference.
They were also plotting to isolate South Korea from the inter-
national political arena and overthrow the South Korean govern-
ment.
2. Nitcho Association (North Korea-Japan Association)
.
Under the pretext of promoting economic and cultural exchange
between North Korea and Japan, the Nitcho Association was
formed on June 10, 1951. However, they used the First National
Conference which was held in November 1955, to transform this
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association into the 'Organization for the Promotion of
Chosoren Support Cooperation, ' and assumed the distinct
characteristics of spokesman for the Chosoren and North Korea
in Japan.
In order to effectively develop the Chosoren supporting
activities, the Nitcho Association, under its umbrella, formed
"The Nitcho Realization for Free Travel Liaison Committee," and
on October 23, 196 3, formed the "Committee for the Protection
of Human Rights for Koreans in Japan." These organizations,
together with the Chosoren' s "Racial Rights Protection Enter-
prise," have developed various support activities to make
possible exchanges between North Korea and Japan.
3. The Nitcho Trade Committee (North Korea-Japan Trade
Committee) . In response to a declaration by Nam II, the Foreign
Minister of North Korea, establishing normalization of diplomatic
relations with Japan in February 1955, the Nitcho Trade Committee
was organized on March 6, 1956, thus formalizing trade relations
between Japanese companies and North Korean concerns.
The Nitcho Trade Committee furthered its friendship
with North Korea under the principle of attaining equal and
mutual benefits for both countries and, subsequently, when it
was organized to promote trade negotiations by dispatching
representatives from each company several times each year.
Thus, in September 19 57, with North Korea's "International
Trade Promotion Committee," Japan concluded trade agreements
6 million pounds, valid for one year.
In August 196 5, Nitcho Trade Committee agreed on
general terms concerning trade transactions, and promoted trade
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with North Korea. Together with Chosoren organizations, and
"Asahi Export-Import Company," the Nitcho Trade Committee
played the role of front guard to promote and protect North
Korea's business activities in Japan.
4. The Nitcho Friendship Promotion Committee Association
(Nitcho Friendship Association) . Upon returning from a visit
to North Korea on August 19, 1971, Yufuku Akamatsu, Vice-
Committee Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party, announced
a plan to form a goodwill association with the cooperation of
non-partisan congressmen and the North Korean government.
An initiation meeting was held on October 14, 1971 at which the
goals of the Nitcho Friendship Association were to promote:
(1) goodwill between North Korea and Japan, and (2) under-
standing of the Koreans who desire unification of their homeland
After a preparatory general conference on November 15, 1971, an
organizational general assembly was held the next day. Using
the office of Tsunehiko Yasutaku (a Socialist Party Dietman)
as its base, Nitcho Friendship Association retained a total of
five members. These five members were: (1) Chuji Hisano
(Liberal-Democratic Party) , as committee chairman pro tempore;
(2) Tokkaku Ashii (Socialist Party) , Kyo Moji (Democratic
Socialist Party), Yasuyuki Okimoto ('Komeito' Party), Zentaro
Taniguchi (Communist Party) , and Kazuhiko Nozue (Independent)
,
all four members as vice-committee chairman. Besides these
members were a standing committee of eleven directors, twenty
directors, and six supervisors. The register of the entire
membership was not open to the public. According to the
announcement made by the Nitcho Friendship Association, the
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total number of members was 240, divided as follows: (1)
Liberal-Democratic Party, 31; (2) Socialist Party, 155 (entire
members); (3) Democratic Socialist Party, 15; (4) Communist
Party, 24 (entire members; and (5) Independent Party, 6.
The Nitcho Friendship Association promoted the exchange
of economic, cultural, artistic and athletic representatives
and science and technology. Further, it was known to have
promoted the Chosoren's repatriation program, free travel to
North Korea and a guarantee of re-entry visa to Japan, the
protection of racial rights, and the unification of the Korean
peninsula
.
On January 16, 1972, thirteen members from the House
of Representatives and two others were dispatched to North
Korea as representatives of the Japanese government and
signed the "document of consent for the promotion of trade
between North Korea and Japan." In this manner the Nitcho
Friendship Association became a pressure group to achieve the
political goals of the North Korean government in Japan, and
thus expanded its organization down to the district level.
5. The Others. Aside from the organizations described,
there are other pro-North Korea groups such as the Nitcho
Joint Committee for Science and Technology; The Round Table
Committee concerned with the Racial Education for Koreans in
Japan; the Joint Committee concerned with the Racial Education
for Koreans in Japan; the Joint Committee for Repatriation of
Koreans in Japan; and the Committee for the Promotion and
Exchange of Arts and Science between North Korea and Japan.
Under the active support and guidance of the Chosoren, these
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organizations carried out the anti-South Korea activities
of the North Korean government. These activities were ascer-
tained by the Japanese Public Security Commission. On September
5, 1974, to the question raised by Dietman Shintaro Ishihara
(Liberal-Democratic Party) , "Is it not considered appropriate
to acknowledge South Korea's allegation that Japan has become
the base for North Korean government's anti-South Korea
operation?" Mr. Sanda, the Secretary of Japanese Police,
replied that, "From 1950 to the present, there have been 34
incidences of underground espionage activity and 57 North
Korean underground operation workers have been arrested. It
became evident that the majority of them were engaged in the
anti-South Korea operations." x
Thus, through various Chosoren affiliated organizations
in Japan, the activities of Korean residents affect the
Japanese government on a political level.
In economy, these organizations made a significant




A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY
When the normalization of relations with Japan was estab-
lished in 1965, a number of KBA (Korean Businessmen's Association)
businessmen, who were prominent in the South Korean economy and
were participating in the five-year economic plan, saw great
business opportunities in the prospect of some $800 million of
Japanese capital that would be brought into South Korea. The
prospect of better Japanese relations thus provided them an
opportunity for shifting the orientation of their businesses
from the poor domestic market to the exploration of richer
foreign markets, with the help of Japanese capital, technology,
and market skills. These Korean businessmen were also hopeful
that Japan would liberalize its tariff and eliminate other
restrictions on the importance of Korean products in order to
92improve South Korea's balance of trade.
In Japan, those businessmen who promoted an early conclu-
sion of the South Korea-Japan negotiations were a group of
powerful capitalists known as the "Korea lobby," in alliance
with the pro-South Korea faction of conservative politicians.
Most of them belonged to the so-called Kansai Zaibatsu, and
among them were the fifteen top capitalists in Japan, who
financed the key factional bosses in the Liberal Democratic
Party. 93
The pro-South Korean lobbyists were led, among politicians,
by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Justice Ishii
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Mitsujiro and Vice-President of the Liberal Democratic Party
94Ono Bankoku.
Their formal organization was the South Korea-Japan Economic
Cooperation Organization, the Federation of Economic Organiza-
tions, and the Japan Federation of Employers Associations. The
primary political organization of the pro-South Korean group
was the "consultative study for the South Korea-Japan Problem"
95in the Liberal Democratic Party.
Between 1962 and 1965, Japanese economic survey missions,
including leading figures of industry and finance, visited
South Korea to explore opportunities for Japanese investments
there. South Korea promised to be ideal in view of the geo-
graphical and cultural affinity. Furthermore, the expanding
investments of the United States, West Germany, France, and
Italy in South Korea, in conjunction with the five-year economic
plan, caused Japanese businessmen to fear that they would be
eliminated from the Korean market unless diplomatic relations
were established soon. Thus, economic cooperation, which would
involve an estimated $800 million worth of products and
services after the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries, was the prime concern of the pro-
96South Korean Japanese lobbyists.
It is clear that considerable pressure was exerted by the
capitalists of both countries, especially those of Japan, on
their governments and that this pressure was one of the decisive
factors in bringing the South Korea-Japan negotiations to an
early conclusion. Japanese intellectuals and leftists called
the South Korea-Japan rappproachment "monopolistic capitalists'
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aggression against South Korea," "exploitation of the South
Korean market and cheap labor," and even "oppression of the
Japanese workers by using the surplus labor of the South Korean
at low wages." South Koreans who opposed the South Korea-Japan
Treaty used similar terms, but in a different context, des-
97cribmg the treaty as economic aggression by Japan.
The Foreign Capital Induction Plan of South Korea was estab-
lished to carry out the second five-year plan. Foreign capital
investment began to increase from 196 7, and it reached $1
billion by 1972. 98
The rapid growth in the South Korean economy was due mainly
to the expansion of the export industry, with foreign capital
investment undoubtedly contributing much to the growth. In 19 70,
the South Korean government constructed the free export district
in Masan and, in 1973, constructed a plant for the electronics
industry in Kumi, the birthplace of President Pak Chung-hee, in
99South Korea. The majority of the enterprises which penetrated
South Korean industry were made possible by Japanese capital
investment. Japanese capital poured into South Korea from
Korean residents in Japan. The investment made by the Korean
residents came from those who qualified themselves under the
Article II of the Foreign Capital Induction Plan, i.e., "those
Koreans who maintained Korean citizenship and continuously
lived abroad more than 10 years are eligible for such investment."
Therefore, almost the entire amount of the investment made by





One such major investment made by Korean residents was the
Pang-nim Textile Company, established with a capital invest-
ment of 1,500,000,000 Won. Another was the Yun-sung Textile
Company, which was built with a capital investment of
1,200,000,000 Won in Kumi . Of the 201 Korean export indus-
trial enterprises which are scattered between Seoul and Inchon,
twenty-seven of them were set up with investments made by
Korean residents of Japan. On the other hand, there were only
eleven enterprises were set up by other foreigners. It is
further estimated that the seventy-seven joint capital invest-
ment enterprises included some capital from Korean residents
of Japan. The vested interests held by the Korean residents
are included in the Japanese investment, and therefore, it is
difficult to distinguish them separately. For example, in the
case of the Korean Television Corporation, it appears as 100
percent Japanese capital investment; however, it is 80 percent
Toshiba, and the other 20 percent belongs to Korean residents
in Japan. With Korean Electronics Corporation, the Toshiba-
Korean residents ratio is 70-30.
Thus, in the Japanese capital investments in Korea, there
are three types of investments.
1. It is 100 percent Japanese capital investment both in
reality and formality;
2. It is 100 percent Japanese investment in formality;
however, in reality, it is a joint investment between
the Japanese and the Korean residents;
3. It is a joint investment between the Japanese and the
Korean residents in both reality and formality;
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4. Further, in reality, it may be 100 percent South
Korean investment; however, since it includes the in-
vestment made by the Korean residents of Japan, on the
surface, it is considered a joint investment.
These Japanese investment firms continue to help strengthen
South Korean economy which has shown a remarkable growth in
recent years.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY
1 . Trade Agreements
The initial trade between North Korea and Japan began
in June 19 56 when representatives from four Japanese trade firms
visited North Korea to conclude an agreement to open the trade
between the two countries, to be carried out via Dairen, Manchuria,
In Pyongyang in September 19 57, the Nitcho (Japan-North Korea)
Trade Agreement was formally concluded between the North Korean
International Trade Promotion Committee and three Japanese
trade firms. However, within one year, by September 1958, the
Nitcho Trade Agreement was invalidated. Later, in May 19 59
"The Nitcho Direct Trade General Assembly" was held in Tokyo
by the Nitcho trade members to reopen the North Korea-Japan
trade. In April 1961, the Japanese government approved direct
import-export trade with North Korea. In February 19 63,
general agreement was reached concerning trade items between
the Japanese and North Korean trade firms. In September 1963
a contract was concluded between the Mitsui Bank and the North
Korean Trade Banks. Up to 1963, the trade volume between the
two countries was: $8,999,000 in 1961; $9,300,000 in 1962;
and did not exceed a billion dollars. However, in 196 3 the
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trade volume reached $14,800,000 for the first time. In 1964
the trade volume jumped to $31,500,000— twice that of the
previous year. From 1965 to 1967 the total trade volume
remained at about $40,000,000, and during the period from
1968 to 1971, due to an increase in Japanese exports, the
trade volume was increased to $50,000,000. Again in 1972
the total value of trade jumped to $132,000,000 and $100,000,000
From 1956 to 19 71, the trend of Nitcho trade was on the
increase, and the year 19 72 observed an even greater increase.
However, due to North Korea's unfavorable foreign exchange
record, which began to surface from mid-1974, the trade volume
began to fall. In 1976 monthly exports with North Korea were
between $6 to $8 million. From 1975 to the middle of 1976,
imports from North Korea remained at $5 million per months,
which meant that the trade represented a mere one fifth of the
total trade of the peak period.
2 . Significance of the Nitcho Trade
a. Significance to Japan. Although the Japanese
government has approved the export insurance, it is entirely
free of any control over Nitcho trade. Most of the trade
firms participating in the trade are small and middle-sized
companies in Japan. Nitcho trade in Japan is a private enter-
prise. The entire Nitcho trade amount, even during the peak
period, represented only 0.31 percent of the entire Japanese
trade volume and, therefore, to the Japanese economic sector
North Korea is not such an an attractive market. Thus, Japan
could literally do with or without Nitcho trade. However,
because of the Japanese government's foreign policies which
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were based on continued friendly relations with all nations
in the world, North Korea-Japan trade continued even though
there were no active diplomatic relations between the two
countries
.
In the private sector Nitcho trade is considered
purely economic, without political overtones. Since trade
with China was dominated by the big companies in Japan, most
companies participating in Nitcho trade were small and middle-
sized, venturing into communist countries. Therefore, for
Japan, the significance of Nitcho trade is the opportunity
for middle-sized companies to earn outside of Japan.
b. Significance to North Korea. Generally, the
communist countries' trade and economic exchanges with the
Western world are not purely economic; rather, they have
strong political implications. The primary purpose is to earn
foreign currencies which provide the funds needed for the
Communist Revolution. Another purpose is the exchange of
personalities from political circles. Therefore, the purpose
lies beyond the mere exchange of trade itself.
Through Nitcho trade, North Korea is able to pene-
trate Japanese political and economic circles. Some of the
items exported to North Korea such as gliders, rubber boats,
and diving suits, which were shippped under "Maritime Accident
Rescue Use," have been utilized for the military in North Korea
When the tunnel which was dug by the North Korean workers was
discovered by the South Korean government, there were Japanese
radios among the items left behind in the tunnel. Almost all
of the rubber boats used by the North Korean guerrilla force
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penetrating into South Korea through the sea route, were
Japanese products.
The Nitcho trade proves a far greater boon to
North Korea than to Japan, not only in the economic sector
but also in the political and military fields. Judging by
the North Korean government's inability to pay off the trade
balance on time, North Korea-Japan trade does not carry much
significance to Japan.
3. North Korea's Unpaid Debts to Japan
Concerning the unpaid trade debts owed by North Korea
to Japan in the amount of $250 million, the Nitcho Trade
Association urgently invited 50 representatives from the banks
and related companies to seek a final solution. On July 28,
19 76, the Asahi and the Mainichi newspapers reported the
solution as follows:
(1) The Terms of the Payment.
(a) The Long Term Debts: Payments due for the
1975-78 period would be extended for two years.
(b) The Short Term Debts: Extensions will not be
granted. However, when a settlement cannot be made before a
deadline, the settlement for a given year should be made in
the following year.
(2) The Interest Rate.
(a) The Long Term Debts: The prime rate for long
term debts in 1976 was 9.25% plus 1.25% handling charges.
(b) The Short Term Debts: Payments due in 1974
were at a rate of 11.5%, those due in August 1975 were paid at
9.5%, after September 1975, the BA rate (Bank Note Receipt
83

Rate) plus 3.25% in handling charges, became the accepted
interest rate of 8.75%.
(3) The Payment Method.
(a) Interest payments in arrears should be paid
promptly, and the Japanese government will give notice every
three months of overdue interest payments.
(b) Early remittances can be requested from the
North Korean government should there be any special problems
resulting in the Japanese companies' need for such payments.
(4) The Goods Waiting to be Shipped.
(a) The remittances should be made promptly,
and only the goods specified in the contract should be received
(5) The Payment Guarantees.
(a) If possible, obtain written guarantees from
the governmental organizations, and establish definite repay-
ment schedules
.
(b) Concerning the above (a) , the following plans
were submitted by Mr. Sokawa, the general manager of the Nitcho
Trade Association, when he visited North Korean in June 1976:
(i) The Interest Rate: When it involves the
extension of the two year fixed term, the interest rate would
be 7.5%. When using the international interest market price,
according to the world custom, the prevailing London market
price of the Deutsch Mark for the preceding six month period,
plus the handling charge of 1.25% would be used as the
standard. The Japanese government would have an option of
choosing one of the preceding two alternatives.
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(ii) The extension of the loan payment for
two years would apply only to the loans which would become due
by 1978; however, the payments which were to have been settled
by 1975 should be extended for two and a half years. Concerning
the North Korean government's loan repayment to Japan, as it was
mentioned above, there was a big gap between the two countries,
and thus the Japanese government had begun an investigation
concerning the debt problem. According to the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) , Japan's total outstanding
loan balance to North Korea was reported to have been $240
million as of August 1976. Of the $250 million, the amount
overdue was $60 million.
According to the statistics compiled by the Japanese
External Trade Organization (JETRO) , North Korea's total trade
loan balance was over $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $700
million represented loans obtained from the Soviet Union. It
was apparent, therefore, that so long as there was no assis-
tance from the Soviet Union, a breakthrough in the deteriorat-
ing economic condition would not be possible.
On June 4, 1979, Japanese trade sources announced that
a three member North Korean Mission would visit Japan in mid-
June to confer with Japanese officials on North Korea's $80
billion outstanding debts. The sources said North Korea would
ask again for deferment of payment of its outstanding trade
accounts in the consultation with Japan. North Korea's large
outstanding accounts in trade with Japan first became an issue




The major causes for the deteriorating economic conditions
in North Korea were: (1) The national energy was directed to
the Defense Industry which could not be expanded; (2) Due to
the six-year plan and the modernization process/ the machinery
and the plants were overworked; (3) The prevailing unfavorable
international market for Zinc, which had been the major export
item; (4) After 1972, the period which was originally aimed
toward the expansion of trade with the West, there occurred
instead a major swing towards the purchase of petroleum.
North Korea was aiming for a self-supporting economy and,
therefore, began producing industrial machinery of its own.
In the machine industry it was superior to South Korea but the
cost of production was higher than imported machinery. These
were the major causes for the deterioration of the economic
situation in North Korea. North Korea was manufacturing
machinery while ignoring the high production costs, and these
factories could not be readily transformed to munitions pro-
duction.
Although there were no direct capital investments made in
North Korea by Korean residents, the North Korea-Japan trade
played a vital role in maintaining the mutual ties between
Japan and North Korea without the formal establishment of
diplomatic relations. Further, the Japan-North Korean trade
had some of the implications in the North Korean economy
mentioned below.
1. North Korea's Refusal to Renew Visas for Japanese
Businessmen. On August 31, 19 76, according to the announcement
made by the Nitcho Trade Association and the Japanese governmental
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agencies, the North Korean government refused to extend visas
for Japanese businessmen who were visiting North Korea and
demanded their immediate return to Japan. There were approxi-
mately ten individuals who were refused an extension of visas,
and of these some were businessmen and some were technicians
from the Hidate Shipbuilding Company. Along with denial of
visa extension, the North Korean government, through the Nitcho
Export-Import Trade Association, requested that the seven
business firms which were anticipating a goodwill visit to
North Korea postpone their visit until further notice. North
Korea, however, did not specify its reasons. The denials of
visa extensions was limited to only a few businessmen and
technicians, and thus approximately 80 technicians working in
the cement plant were allowed to stay in North Korea. However,
the postponement of the goodwill visit to North Korea by
Japanese businessmen was not limited only to Nitcho trade
relations. In early September 1976, the Central Chosoren
Committee announced the cancellation of its forthcoming visit
to Pyongyang by the representative groups in Japan to commemo-
rate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean
government on September 9, 1976. These steps were taken by
North Korea after the Panmunjom incident of August 18, 1976.
2. The Shin-Nichi Testsu (New Japan Iron) Company halts
Iron Ore Import from North Korea. Since 1963, North Korea has
exported iron ore from the Moosan Mine in North Korea to the
Shin-Nichi Iron Company in Japan. In 1976 the Shin-Nichi Iron
Company was notified by North Korean that the export price of
iron ore would go up more than 50 percent. The Shin-Nichi Iron
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Company decided to discontinue its importation of iron ores
for 1976. According to the Nitcho Trade Association, during
the 1970-75 five-year period, the Shin-Nichi Iron Company
imported 400 thousand tons of iron ore from the Moosan Mine
totaling $96.7 billion in value. The price increase of more
than 50 percent was not acceptable to the Shin-Nichi Iron
Company. Meanwhile, future plans for the importation of iron
ore from North Korea remained unclear.
The loss of the Japanese market became more crucial to
North Korea when trade was discontinued between North Korea
and Western Europe. On August 29, 19 76, England, Germany,
and France discontinued their trade with North Korea by
applying for export insurance through the Nitcho Trade Associa-
tion. In Sweden it was reported that even after expiration of
the first moratorium, which ended in June 1976, the North
Korean government's overdue payments remained unpaid.
The transactions for the Nitcho Trade Association during
the 1976-77 period are show in Tables XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.
4 . The Total Transactions for the Nitcho Trade Association
in 1976
The total value of the Nitcho Trade Association's
transactions to pass through customs in 1976 amounted to
285,700,042,000 Yen. Imports were 212,430,401,000 Yen, and
total trade amounted to 498,130,443,000 Yen. Compared to the
total trade for the Nitcho Trade Association in 1975, exports
decreased by half, whereas imports increased by ten percent.
During the same period, the excess of exports from Japan was
75 Billion Yen, compared to 41.8 Billion Yen and 34 Billion
Yen for 1974 and 1975, respectively.
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In comparison to the volume of trade between the
Socialist countries and Japan, trade between North Korea and
Japan for 19 76 was the seventh highest, ranking behind the
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Poland, Cuba,
Vietnam, and Rumania (It ranked fifth in 19 75.) . The total
value of transactions were as follows:
TABLE XXVI
THE NITCHO TRADE ASSOCIATION'S TRANSACTIONS
TO PASS THROUGH CUSTOMS
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)




















































VALUE OF TRADE BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
AND JAPAN FOR 19 76
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)
Country Japan's Exports Japan's Imports Total
Soviet Union 667,521,797 346,287,434 1,013,809,231
PRC 496,599,310 406,549,339 903,148,649
Poland 75,265,443 22,870,303 98,135,746
Cuba 59,528,182 14,899,193 74,427,375
Vietnam 49,588,526 14,516,300 64,104,826
Rumania 39,588,006 13,838,355 53,427,361
North Korea 28,570,042 21,243,401 49,813,443
Yugoslavia 28,407,845 4,425,192 32,833,037
East Germany 14,489,161 4,066,623 18,555,784
Bulgaria 13,991,277 4,541,915 18,533,192
Czechoslovakia 8,873,548 9,172,684 18,046,232
Hungary 9,953,930 3,597,903 13,551,833
Albania 694,563 162,628 857,191
Mongolia 137,773 126,158 263,931
TOTAL 1,493,209,403 866,298,428 1,359,507,831
Source: The Study of the North Korean Economy, April 1977, p. 35.
The total value of the Nitcho Trade Association's trans-
actions passing through customs for the first quarter of 1977
came to 7,9 80,360,000 Yen in imports (This figure is 87.3 percent
of the 1976 amount for the same quarter.), 5,190,578,000 Yen in
imports (13.85 percent of the amount for the same period in 1976),
and total value of trade amounted to 13,173,000,947,000 Yen (only
10.21 percent of the volume for the same period in 1976) .





THE MAIN EXPORT ITEMS
FIRST QUARTER, 1977
(Unit: 1,000 Yen)
Items Unit Quantity Amount %
1. Weedkiller KG 885,000
2. Transmitters and Tran-
ceivers (Ultra Short
Wavelength) KO 387
3. Unwoven Cloth KG 219,441
4. Printing Papers KG 1,967,974
5. Corks and Half-Finished
Corks MT 8,765
6. Lead MT 1,864
7. Synthetic Fibers (Tire
Cords and Polyamide
Fibers) KG 297,054
8. Aluminum Wares and
Accessories
9. Synthetic Fabrics (Poly-
ester Fabrics, Over 85%)
10. Craft Papers and Boards
11. Nickel Ore
12. Synthetic Fabrics (Poly-
amide Fabrics, over 85%)
13. Lubricating Oil









Machinery for the Food











KG 65,894 187,857 2.3
KG 1,784,915 179,687 2.3
MT 100 151,183 1.9
KG 56,923 134,562 1.7




















Source: The Study of the North Korean Economy, June 7, 19 77, p. 37
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Separately, the Korean residents of Japan sent contri-
butions to help build the North Korean economy as specified
below.
5 . Economic Contributions to North Korea by the Korean
Residents of Japan
Unlike the capital investments in the South Korean
economy by the Korean residents of Japan, funds in the form
of contributions were sent to North Korea to help set up
various plants and factories over a period of time.
In 1973 the Aeguk Textile Company was set up with a
gift fund sent by the Korean residents of Japan in the amount
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of 500 million Yen. The machinery used in this factory was
manufactured by the Ohkuma Corporation in Japan. Another
textile company, the Kangso Aeguk Textile Company, was set up
in the Sohak mountain region in Kangso, Pyongan-Namdo . This
three-story building was donated by the Daito Ueno Branch and
the Edogawa Branch in Tokyo. The third factory, the
Namhung Grain Factory, which is engaged in extracting oil from
grain, was also established by funds sent by the Korean resi-
dents of Japan. The fourth factory, the Pyongyang Aeguk
Noodle Factory, was a gift to commemorate Kim Il-sung's 6 5th
10 8birthday. On August 14, 1979 Pyongyang Octane Factory
began operations. This factory is engaged in the production
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of Octane using corn as raw material.
Thus, since 19 56 when the initial trade between Japan
and North Korea began, Korean residents of Japan helped to




VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The year 1979 marks the 34th year since the Korean people
regained their freedom from Japan. More than six decades have
passed since the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The
Japanese government enslaved the Korean people, robbed them
of their land, and even tried to eliminate their culture.
Beginning in the 19 20's and continuing until the end of World
War II, many Koreans migrated to Japan seeking their liveli-
hood. There were also other groups of Koreans who were sent
to Japan as laborers or were drafted by the Japanese colonial
government.
Since most of these Korean emigrants, with the exception
of students and draftees, were illiterate or semi-illiterate,
they were employed mostly in low-paying jobs, and thus held
the lowest socio-economic status in Japanese society. Accord-
ingly, Korean immigrants in Japan were often criticized for
their foreign manners and conduct, and became targets for
ridicule and humiliation by the Japanese. After World War II,
of the 2.5 million Koreans remaining in Japan, the majority
were repatriated to their homeland, leaving approximately
600,000 Korean residents.
The Korean group in Japan is divided factionally. The
Mindan, the pro-South Korean faction has support from the
Liberal Democratic Party, which maintains close economic and
political ties with the Pak Chung-hee regime. The Chosoren,
the pro-North Korea faction, maintains its loyalty to the
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the Kim Il-sung regime and actively propagates the 'Chuche'
ideology to the Korean residents in Japan.
From the sociological point of view, the ethnic conscious-
ness and cohesiveness of the Korean residents of Japan is very
strong. They maintain their national identity, form their
organizations, and send their children to Korean schools.
Since the first-generation Koreans migrated to Japan in the
1920' s, by the 1950-60 period there were a larger number of
second-generation Koreans in Japan. During the 1950-60 period,
with the cooperation of the Japanese government, an attempt was
made to establish a greater mutual understanding between the
two groups: Japanese society and the Korean residents. An
example is the exchange program set up by Japanese education
authorities to encourage Japanese students to study in Korean
schools in Japan. Thus, a greater understanding of the two
cultures was emphasized. Consequently, a degree of assimila-
tion among the second-generationKorean youths began to take
place. Those Koreans who were assimilated into Japanese
society, especially those who intermarried, had somewhat
improved opportunities in securing employment, job advancements,
and degree of acceptance by the Japanese. For the third-
generation Korean youths, the future holds an opportunity for
a yet greater degree of assimilation. It remains to be seen,
however, whether such assimilation is desirable.
The South Korea-Japan Treaty of 196 5 granted permanent
resident status to Korean residents who entered Japan prior
to August 16, 1945. The treaty provided a livelihood, social
welfare, and health benefits to the Korean residents. Although
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the legal status of Korean residents in Japan was established
with the normalization of relations between South Korea and
Japan, the inconsistency of the Japanese government's treatment
of Korean residents brought disadvantages to the Koreans.
Hence, the scope of their economic activities is still very
limited. The majority of the Korean residents hold such
speculative jobs as running entertainment facilities and
restaurants. They are also generally employed in the Mindan
or Shosoren-operated organizations and, in comparison to their
Japanese counterparts, receive much lower salaries. Although
they command pay equivalent to that of the Japanese in the
professional and technical fields, such opportunities are quite
limited to the Korean residents.
Korean residents must pay 10-20 percent more in taxes than
the Japanese. This is because there are no provisions made
for some of the legal organizations or industries to qualify
Korean residents for tax exemptions, and the majority of the
Korean residents hold occupations which place them within the
more heavily taxed categories. Consequently, despite the
phenomenal growth in the Japanese economy, little favorable
change in the livelihood of the Korean residents has taken
place. The economic situation of Korean residents in Japan
did not improve much after the South Korea-Japan Treaty of
1965.
The idea of a unified homeland remains very strong in the
minds of many Koreans living in Japan. They envision a day
when the entire Korean peninsula will have been unified under
one government. However, as long as these Koreans are involved
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in a conflict between the communist and the non-communist
world, the solution to their problems hinges upon international
relations in Asia. Their future will be more closely connected
with global relations to the great powers than with the political




44 Untied Nations — Treaty Scries I96fi
No. S471. TREATY 1 ON BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. STONED AT
TOKYO, ON 22 JUNE 19G5
Japan and the Republic of Korea,
Considering the historical background of relationship between their pcopk-.-
and their mutual desire for go&d neighborliness and for the normalization of their
relations on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty
;
Recognizing the importance of their close cooperation in conformity with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the promotion of their mutual
welfare and common interests and to the maintenance of international peace and
security ; and
Recalling the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Pence with Japan signed at the
city of San Francisco on September S, 1951 2 and the Resolution 195 (III) adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1948 ; 3
Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty on Basic Relations and have accord-
ingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries.
Japan :
Etsusaburo Shiina, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
Shinichi Takasugi
The Republic of Korea :
Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea
Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic
of Korea
Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good
and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :
1 Came into force on IS December 1965, the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification
at Seoul, in acw rdance with atticle VII.
* United Nations. Tt-ealy Seties, Vol. 13fi, p. 15.
' United Nations, Oijieial Recordt of the third session of the Genoa! Asumblv, PUrl I. Rcsjtit-
tier.s (A/MO), p. 25.
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Article I
Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the High Con-
tracting Praties. The High Contracting Parties shall exchange diplomatic envoys
with the Ambassadorial rank without delay. The High Contracting Parties will also
establish consulates at locations to be agreed upon by the two Governments.
Article II
It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire
of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null
and void.
Article III
It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful
Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations
Generol Assembly.
Article IV
[a) The High Contracting Parties will be guided by the principles of the Charter
of the United Nations in their mutual relations.
(b) The High Contracting Parties will cooperate in conformity with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations in promoting their mutual welfare and
common intererts.
Article V
The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiations at the earliest prac-
ticable date for tin- conclusion of treaties or agreements to place their trading, mari-
time and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.
Article VI
The High Contracting Parties will enter into negotiaiions at the eailiest practi-
cable date for the conclusion of an agreement relating to civil air transport.
Article VII
The present Treaty shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be
exchang- d at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as
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In witness whekkof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signet! the pr«*scnt
Treaty and have aliixod thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate at Tokyo, this twenty-second day of June of the year one
thousand nine hundred and sixty-five in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages,
each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the














Agreement on the legal status and treatment of nationals of
the Republic cf Korea residing in Japan (with agreed
minutes and record of discussions). Signed at Tokyo,
on 2r June 1965
Official texts: Japanese and Korean.




Accord relatif au statut juridique ct au traitement des res-
sorlissauts de la Republique de Coree residaut au Japon
(avec proces-verbal approuve et proces-verhal des dis-
cussions). Signe a Tokyo, lc 22 juin 1965
Textes officiels japonais et coreen.
Enregistri par le Japan le 15 decembre 1966.
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32 United Nations — Treaty Series 1966
[Translation 1—Traduction2]
No. 8474. AGREEMENT3 ON THE LEGAL STATUS AND THE
TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUB-
LIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JA-
PAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. SIGNED AT
TOKYO, ON 22 JUNE 1965
Japan and the Republic of Korea,
Considering that nationals of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan for
many years have come to have special relations with Japanese society; and
Recognizing that enabling these nationals of the Republic of Korea to lead a
stabilized life under the social order of Japan will contribute to the promotion of
friendly relations between the two countries and their peoples;
Have agreed as follows :
Article I
1. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in
Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea falling under either of the following
categories, if he applies for such permission within five years from the date of
the entry into force of the present Agreement in accordance with the procedure
to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation of the
present Agreement
:
(a) A person residing in Japan since August 15, 1945, or a date prior
thereto, continuously until the time of his application; or
(b) A person born in Japan on or after August 16, 1945 and before the period
of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agrce-
1 Translation by the Government of J.ipan. The Sccrenri.it also received an English trans-
lation of this agreement from the Government of the Republic of Korea which on certain points
dillers from that provided by the Government of J.ipan. At the request of the Government of
the Republic of Korea, these differences have been shown by printing in italics the pertinent word
of phrase in the translation of the Government of Japan and providing in square brackets the
corresponding expression in the translation by the Government of the Republic of Korea.
: Traduction du Gou\crncmcnt japonais. Lc Gouvcriument de la Republiquc dc Coree a
{galement communique au Secretariat unc traduction anglaisc de cet accord qui dillcre en certains
points dc celle transmit par le Gouvernement japonais. A la dem.'.ndc du Gotivcrnenient dc la
Repuhh'que de Coree, on a indique en italiquc dans In traduction transmisc par le Gouvernement
japonais cheque mot ou j^m'-re de mots donnant lieu .i divergence et introduit a la suite entre
crochets l'e\prcssion correspond.intc dans la tiaduction fournie par le Gouvernement de la Repu-
blique de Coree.
'Came into force «.n 17 January 19Cf>, the thirtieth day following the exchange of the instru-
ments of ratification, which took place at Seoul on IS December 1965, in accordance with article VI.
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ment expires, as a lineal descendant of a person falling under (a) above,
and residing in Japan continuously until the time of his application.
2. The Government of Japan shall give permission for permanent residence in
Japan to a national of the Republic of Korea who is born in Japan after the lapse
of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement as a
child of a person who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 above, if such child applies for
such permission within sixty days from the date of birth in accordance with the
procedure to be established by the Government of Japan for the implementation
of the present Agreement.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above, the application period
for permission for permanent residence shall be sixty days from the date of birth
in the case of a person who falls under paragraph 1 (b) above and is born after
the lapse of four years and ten months from the date of the er.tr}' into force of
the present Agreement.
4. No fee shall be levied for the above-mentioned applications and permissions.
Article II
1. With respect to the residence in Japan of the nationals of the Republic of
Korea born in Japan as lineal descendants of the persons who are given per-
mission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of
Article I, the Government of Japan agrees, if requested by the Government of
the Republic of Korea, to holding consultations until twenty-five years zvill have
elapsed [by the lapse of twenty-five years] from the date of the entry into force of
the present Agreement.
2. In the consultations under the preceding paragraph, the spirit and purposes
which form the basis of the present Agreement shall be respected.
Article III
A national of the Republic of Korea who is given permission for permanent
residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I shall not be
deported from Japan unless he comes to fall under any of the following categories
by. his act [acts] committed on or after the date of the entry into force of the
present Agreement
:
(a) A person who, for crimes concerning insurrection or crimes concerning
foreign aggression, is sentenced in Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier
punishment (except a person who is granted the suspension of execution
of such sentence or who is sentenced for reasons of responding to an
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(b) A person who, for crimes concerning foreign relations, is sentenced in
Japan to imprisonment or to a heavier punishment, or a person who,
for his criminal acts committed against the head of a foreign state, a
diplomatic envoy or his official premises, is sentenced to imprisonment
- or to a heavier punishment and thereby prejudice vital interests of Japan
in its foreign relations;
(c) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan concerning
control of narcotics with profitmaking intents, is sentenced to penal
servitude or imprisonment for life or for not less than three years (except
a person who is granted the suspension of execution of such sentence),
or a person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan concern-
ing control of narcotics, is sentenced to penalties not less than three
times (twice in the case of a person who was sentenced to penalties not
less than three limes by his acts committed prior to the date of the entry
into force of the present Agreement); or
(d) A person who, by violating the laws and regulations in Japan, is sen-
tenced to penal servitude or to imprisonment for life r for more than,
seven years.
Article IV
The Government of Japan shall pay due consideration to the following
matters :
(a) Matters concerning education, livelihood protection and national health
insurance in Japan for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are
given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with
the provisions of Article I ; and
(b) Matters concerning taking property with them and remitting funds to
the Republic of Korea in the event that nationals of the Republic of
Korer, who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan
in accordance with the provisions of Article I (including persons
who *re qualified to apply for permission for permanent residence in
accordance with the provisions of the said Article), renounce their inten-
tion of residing permanently in Japan and return to the Republic of
Korea.
Article V
It is confirmed that, with regard to all matters, including entry into and exit
from Japan ard residence in Japan, the nationals of the Republic of Korea who
are given permission for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the
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present Agreement, to the laws and regulations in Japan applicable equally to all
aliens.
Article VI
The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification
shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The present Agreement shall
enter into force on the thirtieth day after the exchange of the instruments of
ratification.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by
their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both
being equally authentic, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand




For the Republic of Korea :
Tong Won Lee
Dong Jo Kim
AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE LEGAL STATUS
AND THE TREATMENT OF THE NATIONALS OF THE REPUB-
LIC OF KOREA RESIDING IN JAPAN BETWEEN JAPAN AND
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The representatives of the Governments of Japan and the Republic of
Korea have reached the following understandings concerning the Agreement on
the Legal Status and the Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea





For the purpose of certifying that a person who applies for permission for
permanent residence in accordance with the provision j of paragraph 1 or 2 of
the Article has the nationality of the Republic of Korea
(i) Such person shall produce his passport or a certificate in lieu thereof, or shall
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(ii) The competent authorities of the Government of the Republic of Korea will
reply in writing in case the competent authorities of the Government of
Japan make inquiries in writing.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 (b) of the Article, " a person falling under
(a) " trill [shall] include a national of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan
since August 15, 1945 or a date prior thereto, continuously until the time of his
death.
Re Article III :
1. For the purposes of (b) of the Article, " his official premises " are the
buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of
ownership, used as embassy or legation (including the residence of the diplo-
matic envoy).
2. The Government of Japan trill [shall], when it intends to deport a person
falling under (c) or (J) of the Article, take into consideration the composition of
his family and other circumstances from a humanitarian standpoint.
3. The Governmei.. of the Republic of Korea trill, in accordance trith [shall,
at the request of] the request of the Government of Japan, co-operate in accept-
ing a person who is to be deported from Japan under the provisions of the Article.
4. It is the policy of the Government of Japan that, when deportation proce-
dures arc taken with respect to a person qualified to apply for permission for
permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agree-
ment, it will, taking into account that should he be given permission for per-
manent residence he shall not be deported from Japan unless he falls under either
of (a) through (d) of Article III, withhold the enforcement of his deportation :
(i) in case he has already applied for permission for permanent residence, until
decision is given on his application; or
(ii) in case he has not applied for permission for permanent residence, until
whether or not he intends to apply is confirmed, and in case he applies, until
decision is given on his application.
Re Article IV :
' 1. In accordance with the laws and regulations, the Government of Japan
trill [shall], when nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission for
permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I of
the Agreement wish to enter a public primary or secondary school of Japan, take
such measures as it deems necessary so that such entracc may be permitted, and
trill [shall], when they finish a secondary school of Japan, recognize their qualifi-
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2. The Government of Jnpan will [shall] have for the time being the present
livelihood protection for the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given
permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of Article I
of the Agreement continued.
3. The Government of Japan trill [shall] take such measures as it deems
necessary in order to insure under the National Health Insurance the nationals of
the Republic of Korea who are given permission for permanent residence in Japan
in accordance with the provisions of Article I of the Agreement.
4. When the nationals of the Republic of Korea who are given permission
for permanent residence in Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article I
of the Agreement (including persons who arc qualified to apply for permission for
permanent residence) renounce their intention of residing permanently in Japan
and return to the Republic of Korea, the Government of Japan tsill [shall]
permit in principle that they may take all their property with them or remit all
their funds.
For this purpose :
(i) with respect to their taking their property with them, the Government of
Japan trill [shall], within the scope of the luws and regulations, permit their
taking with them their personal effec-.s, household goods and professional
tools and equipments, and pay due consideration as much as possible in
authorizing their exportation; and
(ii) with respect to their taking with them or remitting their funds, the Govern-
ment of Japan will [shall], within the scope of the laws and regulations,
permit their taking with them or remitting their funds not exceeding ten
thousand United States dollars per family at the time of their returning home,
and their taking with them or remitting the exceeding amount as the case may
be.




In the course of the negotiations for conclusion of the Agreement on the
Legal Status and the Treatment of Korean Nationals residing in Japan, the
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Japanese Representative : *
'
(a) In the application of the provisions of paragraph 1 (a) of Article I of the
Agreement, it is the policy of the Government of Japan to regard the period
between the departure from Japan for military service or for compulsory labour
recruitment and the arrival in Japan under the repatriation programme as the
period of continued residence in Japan.
(£) The following will be included among those which a person applying
for permission for permanent residence in accordance with the provisions of
Article I of the Agreement is to submit or produce :
(i) Application for permission for permanent residence
(ii) Photograph
(iii) Statement on family relations and residence record in Japan
(iv) Certificate of alien registration.
(c) The term " such measures as it deems necessary " referred to in para-
graph 1 of the part of the Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV
of the Agreement means guidance, advice and recommendation given by the
Ministry of Education in accordance with the laws and regulations presently in
force.
(d) The term " such measures as i: deems necessary" " in paragraph 3 of
the part of the Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV of the
Agreement includes amendment of the ordinance of the Ministry of Welfare.
However, since a preparatory period of considerable length will be necessary for
taking such measures, the Government of Japan will ensure that those Korean
nationals will be insured under the National Health Insurance as from the first
day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year to which the first day after the lapse
of one year from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement belongs.
(e) The Republic of Korea is designated in the notification under the Cabinet
Order concerning the Acquisition of Properties by Aliens as a country to which
the said Order shall not apply, and the Government of Japan has no intention to
delete it upon the entry into force of the Agreement.
(/) It is the policy of the Government of Japan that, when a national of the
Republic of Korea who is given permission for permanent residence in Japan in
accordance witli the provisions of Article I of the Agreement intends to leave
Japan and applies for re-enty permission, it will, within the scope of the laws and
regulations, handle such application as favourably as possible.
Korean Representative :
(a) It is the policy of the Government of the Republic of Korea that, after
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Japan in accepting nationals of the Republic of Korea to be deported from Japan
under the laws and regulations of Japan concerning immigration control.
(b) The Government of the Republic of Korea, while recognizing that a
preparatory period of considerable length will be necessary for taking " such
measures as it deems necessary " referred to in paragraph 3 of the part of the
Agreed Minutes to the Agreement regarding Article IV of the Agreement,
expects that such mcv..-ures will be taken as soon as possible.
(c) The Government of the Republic of Korea is prepared to consider with
the Government of Japan measures for co-operating with the latter to the extent
possible at the hitter's request in order to stabilize the life of the nationals of the
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